Multi-Level Image Authentication Techniques in Printing-and-Scanning. by Jiang, Weina.
Multi-level Image Authentication Techniques in 
Printing-and-scanning
Weina Jiang
Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Supervisor; Prof. Anthony TS Ho 
Co-Supervisor: Dr Helen Treharne
M ultim edia Security and Forensics Group 
D epartm ent of Com puting 
Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences 
University of Surrey 
Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH, U.K.
Septem ber 2012
@ Weina Jiang 2012
ProQuest Number: 27598793
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The qua lity  of this reproduction  is d e p e n d e n t upon the qua lity  of the copy subm itted.
In the unlikely e ve n t that the au tho r did not send a co m p le te  m anuscrip t 
and there are missing pages, these will be no ted . Also, if m ateria l had to be rem oved,
a no te  will ind ica te  the de le tion .
uest
ProQuest 27598793
Published by ProQuest LLO (2019). C opyrigh t of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected aga inst unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C o de
M icroform  Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 81 06 - 1346
D eclaration
This thesis and the work to which it refers are the results of my own efforts. Any ideas, data, 
images or text resulting from the work of others (whether published or unpublished) are fully 
identified as such within the work and attributed to their originator in the text, bibliography 
or in footnotes. This thesis has not been submitted in whole or in part for any other academic 
degree or professional qualification. I agree that the University has the right to submit my work 
to the plagiarism detection service TurnitinUK for originality checks. Wliether or not drafts have 
been so-assessed, the University reserves the right to require an electronic version of the final 
document (as submitted) for assessment as above.
Weina Jiang 
April 2012
A bstract
Printed media, such as facsimile, newspaper, document, magazine and any other publishing 
works, plays an important role in communicating information in today’s world. The printed 
media can be easily manipulated by advanced image editing software. Image authentication 
techniques are, therefore, indispensable for preventing undesired manipulations and protecting 
infringement of copyright. In this thesis, we investigate image authentication for multi-level 
greyscale and halftone images using digital watermarking, image hashing and digital forensic 
techniques including application for printing-and-scanning process.
Digital watermarking is the process of embedding information into the cover image which is used to 
verify its authenticity. The challenge of digital watermarking is the trade-off between embedding 
capacity and image imperceptibility. In this thesis, we compare the work of halftone watermarking 
algorithm proposed by Pu and An. We observe that the image perceptual quality is reduced 
after watermark embedding due to the problems of sharpening distortion and uneven tonality 
distribution. To optimize the imperceptibility of watermark embedding, we propose an iterative 
linear gain halftoning algorithm. Our experiments show that the proposed halftone watermarking 
algorithm improves a significant amount of image quality of 6.5% to 12% by Weighted Signal-to- 
Noise Ratio (WSNR) and of 11% to 23% by Visual Information Fidelity (VIP), compared to Pu 
and An’s algorithm.
While halftone watermarking provides a limited robustness against print-and-scan processes, im­
age hashing provides an alternative way to verily the authenticity of the content. Little work 
has been reported for image hashing to printed media. In this thesis, we develop a novel image 
hashing algorithm based on SIPT local descriptor and introduce a normalization procedure to syn­
chronize the printed-and-scanned image. We compare our proposed hashing algorithm with the 
singular value decomposition based image hashing (SVD-hash) and feature-point based image 
hashing (PP-hash) using the average Normalized Hamming Distance (NED) and the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC). The proposed hash algorithm has shown good performance 
trade-off between robustness and discrimination, as compared to the SVD-hash and PP-hash al­
gorithms quantified by the results obtained via NED and ROC. Our proposed algorithm is found 
to be robust against a wide range of content preserving attacks, including non-geometric attacks, 
geometric attacks and printing-and-scanning.
For our work in digital forensics, we propose in this thesis a statistical approach based on Multi­
sized block Benford’s Law (MEL), and a texture analysis based on Local Binary Pattern (LBP) to 
identily the origins of printed documents. We compare MBL-based and LBP-based approaches to 
a statistical feature-based approach proposed by Gou et al. The proposed MBL-based approach 
provides an ability to identify printers from a relatively diverse sets, while it proves less accurate 
at identifying printers of similar models. The proposed LBP-based approach provides a highly 
accurate identification rate at approximately 99.4%, with a low variance. In particular, our LBP- 
based approach only causes 2% mis-identification rate between two identical printers, whereas 
Gou et a/.’s approach causes 20% mis-identification rate. Our proposed LBP-based approach 
has also successfully demonstrated on printed-and-scanned text documents. Moreover, it remains 
robust against common image processing attacks, including averaging filtering, median filtering, 
sharpening, rotation, resizing, and JPEG compression, with computational efficiency of the order 
of 0(N).
Key words: Authentication, Watermarking, Image Hashing, Perceptual Quality, Local Binary 
Pattern, Scale Invariant Feature Transform, Printer Identification, Scanner Identification, Sensor
Pattern Noise, SVM
Email: w.jiang@surrey.ac.uk
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research M otivation
As image editing software has becoming more advanced and prevalent over the past 
decades, image authentication techniques are indispensable for preventing undesired ma­
nipulations and protecting copyright of content. The printed media, such as facsimile, 
newspaper, document, magazine and any other publishing works, could be scanned and 
easily manipulated by a particular editing software. Image authentication is of signif­
icant importance in printing-and-scanning, to verify the integrity of the printed media 
and identify devices. In literature, various image authentication approaches have been 
investigated by the research commonly based on digital watermarking, image hashing 
and digital forensics [3-14].
The operations involved in printing-and-scanning is presented in the block diagram as 
shown in Figure 1.1. At first, a halftone image generated from a digital process, such 
as halftoning process, till the hardcopy document comes out of a printer, it involves 
a signal transformation process from a digital domain to an analogue domain. It is 
possible to create a new version of the document by using a scanner. Then the signal 
transforms from analogue back to digital again. As such, the printing-and-scanning 
process will introduce distortions. The halftoning algorithms and the distortions related 
to printing-and-scanning are reviewed in Chapter 2 . It is important to develop an image 
authentication algorithm that is robust to printing-and-scanning. In this thesis, we focus
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Figure 1.1; Flowchart of Operations for Printing-and-scanning
on the processes of printing-and-scanning, as highlighted by the three dashed blocks in 
Figure 1.1. Each of the individual dashed block corresponds to image authentication 
approaches based on digital watermarking, image hashing and digital forensics, which 
will be presented in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, respectively.
Digital watermarking refers to the process of imperceptibly embedding a message into a 
cover media according to an embedding algorithm, which allows the embedded message 
to be extracted fiom embedded media after it has been transm itted over a channel. In 
Chapter 3, we consider the use of a digital watermarking scheme during the halftoning 
process. Halftoning is an underlying process used by a printer during printing. The 
halftoning process reconstructs continuous levels of grey values by a limited number 
of grey values, for example, in the conversion of an 8-bit greyscale image to a binary 
image. Such a halftone image causes potential difficulties for waterm ark embedding due 
to  problems associated with image perceptibility. The binary format prohibits traditional 
approaches, such as methods based on least significant bit flipping [1,15] to be applied. 
This format only allows one bit to be changed, toggling the pixel from white to black or 
vice versa. Moreover, the data  capacity in a halftone image also restricts the number of 
watermarks for embedding.
1.1. Research Motivation
In the literature, one example that illustrates the problem of perceptibility is the approach 
proposed by Fu and An [1]. In Chapter 3, we improve the work of Fu and Au. We retain 
the same watermark embedding capacity in our approach, but considerably improve 
the perceptual quality of embedded halftone image by incorporating and optimizing an 
iterative linear gain model [16,17]. We also propose a tonality metric to measure the 
smoothness of the halftone pattern. The results are presented in our previous work [16, 
17].
There are currently only a few techniques reported in the literature aiming to address 
the imperceptibility of a watermark embedding in halftone images, such as [18] and 
[19], and some of these techniques will be reviewed in detail in Chapter 3. As discussed 
above, an authentication scheme based on digital watermarking in halftone image causes 
potential problems. The binary format limits the amount of changes we could make in 
order to meet the imperceptibility and capacity criteria. It is relatively difficult to have 
robustness under the print-and-scan process.
Instead of watermark embedding, we propose a robust authentication based on an image 
hashing scheme as presented in Chapter 4. An image hash is a compact representation of 
an image [8 ]. A successful image hashing scheme relies on image features. The features 
will be further compressed into a binary string, usually a few hundred bits, in order to 
efficiently transmit over a secure channel. At the image authentication end, an image 
is processed by an image hashing algorithm, which is a simple comparison between two 
binary strings measured by the Hamming distance [8-10,20-22]. A number of researchers 
have developed techniques based on robust feature extraction for image hashing [1 0 , 2 0 ]. 
They reported a good robustness performance under content-preserving attacks, such 
as rotation, filtering and JPEG compression. However, the robustness to printing-and- 
scanning was not addressed in these techniques [1 0 , 2 0 ].
Moreover, the robustness performance of these schemes [10,20] was tested under their own 
implemented attacks. In this thesis, our content-preserving attacks are generated by the 
Multimedia Content-based Fingerprinting (MCBF) Toolbox [23], which was developed to 
evaluate the image hashing algorithms. We evaluate the robustness of the schemes [10, 
20] under these attacks including print-and-scan. Comparing to [10,20], we propose to
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adapt Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) features for image hashing, robust to 
printing-and-scanning as these schemes [1 0 , 2 0 ] were found to be not robust to printing- 
and-scanning. In our proposed hashing scheme, the SIFT features are mapped from a 
128-dimension vector of float values into a 1 -dimension vector of binary values for the 
Hamming distance comparison. Our proposed SIFT features based hashing scheme will 
be discussed in Chapter 4, which can be not only robust against the print-and-scan 
process, but also to a wide range of content-preserving manipulations, such as, scaling, 
rotation, shearing, filtering, noise and JPEG compression. Our proposed hashing is highly 
distinctive, as it provides capability at distinguishing perceptually different images [24].
A duplicated image can sometime be misclassified as an authenticated image. Therefore, 
it would be useful to trace the origin of printed images from authorized departments 
in identifying their printers. The identification of devices generally fits into another 
authentication category, known as digital forensics, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
Digital forensic techniques have been developed for identifying imaging devices, such 
as cameras, printers and scanners. A typical forensic technique needs the aid of signal 
processing techniques to remove noise and to extract relevant features. These features 
are distinctive for a particular device, model or manufacture’s identity, which are called 
intrinsic features.
In the literature, Lukas et a l initially proposed a source camera identification scheme 
based on the pattern noise of an imaging sensor [25]. They found that the sensor pattern 
noise provided the unique stochastic characteristic of the imaging sensor. One of the 
key factors in this scheme was the removal of random noise, in addition to the sensor 
pattern noise generated as a result of imaging sensor defects. However, after printing- 
and-scanning, the image pixels were further displaced and their greyscale values modified. 
This was caused by a number of distortions, which might include local geometric distor­
tion, noise during the printing-and-scanning, and mechanical defects related to printers 
or scanners. Their random noise removal method depended on the averaging of multiple 
auto-aligned denoised images taken by a camera. The auto-alignment was controlled by a 
color filter array (CFA) embedded in a camera. However, this method is not practical for 
printed-and-scanned images, because the alignment of images before and after printing- 
and-scanning is difficult. Therefore, the senor pattern noise feature based schemes [25,26]
1.2. Thesis Outline
are not easily applied to printer identification.
In Chapter 5, we investigate a statistical feature based scheme [2] originally proposed by 
Gou et al. for scanner identification. We believe that their scheme is a generic algorithm 
and is not only applicable to scanners, but also to printers. We propose a forensic tool 
based on Multi-sized block Benford’s Law (MBL) to identify a number of different printer 
models [27]. We further investigate image features based on texture analysis, using Local 
Binary Pattern (LBP) based features for printer identification. Our LBP based scheme is 
compared with the statistical feature based scheme [2 ] for identifying printers of similar 
models, in particular, when two printers belong to the same model. We also analysed 
the LBP based scheme for printed-and-scanned text documents. The identification can 
be applied to various types of printers, such as laser and inkjet, while the existing printer 
identification schemes [28,29] rely on the mechanism of laser printers and only applicable 
to laser printers. Our proposed LBP based model remains robust against common image 
processing, including averaging filtering, median filtering, sharpening, rotation, resizing, 
and JPEG compression, and it is also computationally efficient [30].
1.2 Thesis Outline
The thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 reviews the fundamental concept and background related to halftoning 
techniques and printing-and-scanning process.
• Chapter 3 addresses the challenges associated with halftone watermarking tech­
niques. It discusses the performance trade-off between watermark embedding ca­
pacity and image imperceptibility. An iterative linear gain model is proposed in 
this chapter to improve perceptual quality of halftone images based on the same 
watermark embedding capacity in [1 ].
• Chapter 4 investigates an image hashing authentication scheme based on SIFT 
features extraction and feature dimension reduction.
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• Chapter 5 presents the limitations of printer identification algorithms. In this 
chapter, we propose a MBL based scheme and LBP based scheme for printer iden­
tification. We also investigate three different types of statistical features proposed 
in [2]. We evaluate the effectiveness of each type of features for printer identifica­
tion. Their performance is analysed and compared to our proposed schemes.
• Chapter 6  gives conclusions and discusses future work.
1.3 Publications related to Thesis
1.3 .1  Journal P ap ers
• Jiang, W., Ho, A.T.S., Treharne, H., “A Novel Least Distortion Linear Gain 
Model for Halftone Image Watermarking Incorporating Perceptual Quality Met­
rics,” Transactions on Data Hiding and Multimedia Security IV, Springer-Verlag 
LNCS 5510, pp. 65-83, 2009.
1.3 .2  Jou rn al P ap ers U n d er  R ev iew
• Jiang, W., Ho, A.T.S., Treharne, H., “Robust and Secure Image Hashing based on 
SIFT Local Descriptors,” under review of IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, 
March, 2012.
• Jiang, W., Ho, A.T.S., Treharne, H., Shi, Y.Q.,“Local Binary Patterns for Printer 
Identification based on Texture Analysis,” under review of IEEE Transactions on 
Information Forensics and Security, September, 2011.
1.3 .3  C on ference P ap ers
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1.3. Publications related to Thesis
Verlag, Vol 5041, pp 423-439, 2008, International Workshop for Digital Watermark­
ing (IWDW07), Guangzhou, China, 3-5 December 2007.
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Chapter 2
D igital H alftoning and 
Print-and-Scan Channel
Halftoning algorithms have been used by most printers to binarize continuous tone images 
before they are physically printed. In this chapter, we will review different halftoning 
techniques followed by a distortion analysis of the printed-and-scanned image.
2.1 D igital Halftoning
Digital halftoning refers to the process of representing continuous-tone images with a 
finite number of levels for reproduction by display devices [31]. For example, a 24-bit 
colour image can be converted and represented by a 3-bit colour image, and a 8 -bit 
greyscale image by a binary image. These representations are called halftones [31]. The 
human visual system behaves like a low-pass filter which blurs the halftone image to 
generate an illusion of continuous tone or grey levels [32]. Printers, such as inkjet and 
laser, employ halftoning to print ink(s) to paper according to some spatial locations. 
A greyscale printing is made by the halftoning process for colours of black and white, 
whereas a colour printing is made by repeating the halftone process for colours of cyan, 
magenta, yellow and key (black).
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2.1 .1  H a lfto n in g  tech n iq u es
Halftoning quantizes an image into reduced bit depth, for instance, one bit per pixel 
for a greysale image. There are three halftoning methods [33]: error diffusion, ordered 
dithering and Direct Binary Search (DBS).
Ordered dithering is computationally simple. It compares the pixel intensities with some 
pseudo-random threshold patterns or screens to determine its two-tone output [32]. The 
DBS method produces halftones by iteratively searching for the best binary pattern 
to match a given greyscale image by minimizing a distortion criterion. The distortion 
criterion incorporates a linear spatially-invariant model of the human visual system as 
a weighting function. The DBS method produces the halftones with the highest visual 
quality to date. Due to its implementation complexity, it is impractical for use as a 
halftoning method in desktop printers [33].
Error diffusion is a neighbourhood operation by thresholding the current pixel and dif­
fusing the quantization error into pixels of its neighbourhood [33]. The diffusion process 
happens along the path of the image scan. Dithering is a point operation, which compares 
the current pixel with a pre-determined threshold in an array. Therefore, error diffusion 
produces much higher quality than dithering. However, it requires more computation 
and memory [32].
2.2 Greyscale Error Diffusion
Halftoning process by standard error diffusion is shown in Figure 2.1. This process 
scans the image, quantizes the current pixel x{i , j )  and adds the errors diffused from 
previous halftoned neighboring pixels by an error diffusion kernel. The error is equal to 
the subtraction between the output quantized pixel y{i , j )  (binary value) and quantizer 
input pixel (greyscale value) x'{i , j).  Most error diffusion halftones use an error diffusion 
kernel to minimize local weighted errors introduced by quantization. Two popular error 
diffusion kernels are Jarvis [34] as shown in Figure 2.2(a) and Floyd and Steinberg [35] as 
shown in Figure 2.2(b), where the black bullet point indicates the current pixel diffusing 
its errors to its neighbourhood according to the weights represented by the coefficients
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in the error diffusion kernels. These error diffusion kernels have coefficients that sum to 
one, which guarantee that the entire system would be stable. Halftone images generated 
by the Floyd-Steinberg kernel and Jarvis kernel are illustrated in Figure 2.4. The error 
diffusion process can be expressed by the following equations [36], at which a current 
pixel x{i , j )  is scanned and added by the errors generated by the difference between the 
quantization’s binary output y{i , j )  and the quantization’s input
xiujy -M +
//(Z)
V
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Figure 2.1: Standard error diffusion process
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Figure 2.2: Jarvis Kernel (a) and Floyd and Steinberg Kernel (b). The black bullet point 
indicates the current pixel.
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0 ifo ;'(i,j) < 0 .5
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(2.3)
1 i { x ' { i j ) > 0 . b
For example, a current pixel x{ij j )  is added by the errors diffused from previous halftoned 
pixels in an image. Before the addition, the errors are weighted by the coefficients in
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the Jarvis error diffusion kernel. The locations of the errors from previous processed 
pixels are indicated in Figure 2.3. Therefore, the pixel value of x ( i , j )  is modified as
j )  -  Z ) m = -2  Y ^ n = - 2  ^ i+ m ,j+ n  X h m ,n  =  X:{i , j)  “  X 6(0,0) +  ^  X 6 (o ,l)  +  ^  X 6(0,2) +  
A  ^  G(0,3) +  i  X 6(0,4) +  A  X 6(1,0) +  &  X 6(1,1) +  6  X 6(1,2) +  ^  X 6(1,3) +  &  X 6(1,4) +  
^  X 6 (2 ,0 ) 4- ^  X 6 (2 ,1)), which becomes x ' { i , j ) .  The quantizer takes x' { i^j )  as the input 
to yield the halftone value y { i , j ) .
n =
m
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Figure 2.3; The errors add into the current pixel indicated by the black bullet point
2.3 Dithering Algorithm s
Halftoning processing by ordered dithering is a point-to-point comparison. Pixels of a 
continuous tone image are compared to the thresholds from a deterministic and periodic 
array. If the pixel is above the threshold, the pixel is printed. The array of thresholds is 
arranged in a spatial distribution appearing either clustered or dispersed. The halftone 
generated by a clustered ordered array, is called a clustered-dot halftone image. How­
ever, an image generated by a dispersed ordered array, is called a dispersed-dot halftone 
image [32].
2 .3 .1  C lu stered -D o t O rdered  D ith er in g
As presented in Figure 2.5(a), a clustered ordered array of thresholds is compared and 
tiled from the beginning of an image until the end. A halftone dot is formed by a pixel- 
by-pixel comparison of original image with an array of threshold in tiles, which is called
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(a) Lena Halftone Image (b) Barbara Halftone Image
(c) Peppers Halftone Image (d) Bridge Halftone Image
Figure 2.4: Examples of Halftone Images by Error Diffusion
a halftone cell. For clustered-dot ordered dithering, a cluster of ”on” pixels centered in 
each tile/cell, forming a regular grid of round dots that will vary in sizes and shapes 
according to the tone of the original pixels. This is also called Amplitude Modulation 
(AM) halftoning [32], and it has been applied mainly in laser printers. An example of a 
clustered-dot halftone image Lena is illustrated in Figure 2.6(a).
2 .3 .2  D isp ersed -D o t O rdered D ith er in g
The aim of printing isolated dots is to minimize the visibility of the individual dots to a 
human viewer. For dispersed-dot ordered dithering, it compares each pixel to an array 
of different thresholds by dispersing them as much as possible as shown in Figure 2.5(b).
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(a) (b )
Figure 2.5: (a) Clustered-Dot Ordered Dithering and (b) Dispersed-Dot Ordered Dither­
ing
Unlike clustered-dot dithering, dispersed-dot dithering varies the spacing between printed 
dots according to the tone, known as Frequency Modulation (FM) halftoning. However, 
except for a few cases, FM halftoning has only been applied in inkjet printers [32]. An 
example of dispersed-dot halftone image Lena is shown in Figure 2.6(b).
m
(a) Lena Clustered-dot Halftone (b) Lena Disj)ersed-dot Halftone
Figure 2.6: Halftone Image by Dithering
Halftoning of error diffusion has been described as visually pleasing halftone patterns 
composed of randomly placed, isolated dots [33]. Error diffusion that produces higher 
spatial resolution, is usually implemented for inkjet printers. However, the vast majority
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of printing process is still based on AM halftoning due to the poor reliability of many 
devices to reproduce isolated dots [37].
2.4 Images under Print-and-scan
After the image is printed, it is transformed from digital halftoned signal into an analogue 
printout. Once the printout is scanned by a scanner, it is converted back to digital again. 
This inter-transformation between digital to analogue makes the print-and-scan process 
a complex one.
We analyse the changes of images after printing-and-scanning by image quality measure­
ment calculated by PSNR (dB). Fifty images are printed by 7 different printer models 
including HP4200N, HP4015, HP4500, Xerox8500 and two HP4100s. There are 350 
printed-and-scanned images in total. For each printer, the average PSNR value of 50 im­
ages is as follows: 18.65dB for HP4200N, 16.69dB for HP4100(1), 17.44dB for HP4250, 
18.28dB for HP4100(2), 18.39dB for HP4015, 17.76dB for HP4500 and 18.31dB for Xe- 
rox8500 as shown in Figure 2.7. In the box-and-whisker plot as shown in Figure 2.7,
P S N R  D is tr ib u tio n  o f  P r i n t e d - a n d - s c a n n e d  I m a g e s
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Figure 2.7: PSNR Distribution of Printed-and-scanned 350 Images Printed by 7 Printers: 
HP4200N, HP4100(1), HP4250, HP4100(2), IIP4015, 1IP4500, and Xerox8500
the bottom and top of the box are the 25th and 75th percentile the lower and upper
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qiiartiles, respectively, while the band at the middle of the box is the 50th percentile (the 
median). The ends of the whiskers represent the minimum and maximum of all the data. 
The dots appeared in the 2nd and 3rd box-and-whisker plots represent those PSNRs are 
lower than normal (outliers).
An example of an original image and its corresponding printed-and-scanned version is 
illustrated in Figures 2.8(a) and 2.8(b). The difference between the original image and its 
printed-and-scanned version is shown in Figure 2.8(c). It can be seen that a significant 
number of pixels has been modified under the print-and-scan process. This results in 
a relatively low PSNR of approximately 19.42dB, in the printed-and-scanned image as 
shown in Figure 2.8(b). We used MATLAB inshow function to display the image using 
the default number of grey leveles, of which values between the minimum value of the 
image and the maximum value of the image, i.e., imshow(image,[]).
(a) Original Image (b) Printed-and-scanned Image (c) Difference between Image 
2.8(a) and Image 2.8(b)
Figure 2.8: A Comparison between Original Image and Printed-and-scanned Image
2.5 Summary
We reviewed the halftoning techniques in literature and analysed the distortions in the 
print-and-scan process. In the print-and-scan process, the image was distorted even 
though it appeared perceptually identical to the image before it is printed-and-scanned. 
As such, identifying a printed-and-scanned image as an authentic copy becomes difficult 
and challenging. Image authentication has to be not only able to identify the tani-
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pering from a malicious attack, but also withstand the distortion of the print-and-scan 
process. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, image authentication under print-and-scan will 
be investigated by digital watermarking based schemes [3-7] and robust hashing based 
schemes [8-13].
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Chapter 3
D igital W aterm arking for 
H alftone Im age A uthentication
In the literature, there has been numerous image authentication methods developed and 
reported. Generally speaking, these methods are categorized into: digital watermarking 
based methods [3-7] and perceptual image hashing based methods [8-13]. The main dif­
ference between a watermarking based approach and an image hashing based approach is 
that the watermarking based authentication requires imperceptibility of the cover image. 
For watermarking based authentication, a digital watermark is imperceptibly embedded 
into an image to verify the ownership of the content, any manipulation with the content 
would be detected due to the watermark bits. In this chapter, we will review different 
watermarking techniques followed by a distortion analysis of watermarking during an 
error diffusion halftoning process.
3.1 D igital watermarking for image authentication
Cox et al. used spread spectrum approach to embed a watermark signal into a cover im­
age and extracted the watermark using a correlation criterion [3]. They found the most 
significant spectrum components of an image had a perceptual capacity that allowed 
watermarking embedding without perceptual degradation and remained intact after im­
age general processing techniques. They analysed the watermarking robustness against
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general attacks including scaling, cropping, JPEG compression, dithering and printing- 
and-scanning. They found that the detected watermark showed a very low correlation to 
the original watermark especially in context of distortion of dithering and printing-and- 
scanning.
A number of watermarking schemes based on the wavelet transform domain were pro­
posed to address the robustness towards general image processing operations [38-40]. 
Bao and Ma proposed watermark embedding on the singular value of blocked wavelet 
subband coefficients, reporting the robustness against JPEG compression but sensitivity 
towards filtering and random noising [38].
In [41,42], watermarking schemes were proposed to address the robustness against addi­
tive white noise and JPEG compression. Watermarking embedding was based on modi­
fying the most significant coefficients in the ridgelet transform domain. The most signif­
icant coefficients of the ridgelet transform coefficients were located at the most energetic 
direction of an image.
Other watermarking schemes [43-45] have been proposed and reported their robust­
ness against geometric transformations, such as rotation, scaling and translation (RST). 
The watermarking schemes in [3, 38-45] were not proposed particularly for printing- 
and-scanning. The robustness of these schemes [38-45] against print-and-scan was not 
addressed either. Solanki et al. proposed a print-and-scan resilient data hiding approach 
which specifically considered printing-and-scanning attack [6 ]. Their embedding method 
was based on selective embedding in the low frequencies of Discrete Fourier Transform 
(DFT) coefficients.
Solanki et al. [6 ] found that high magnitude coefficients in low frequency band were pre­
served better than low magnitude coefficients in high and mid frequency bands under 
printing-and-scanning attacks. Before watermark embedding, they applied turbo-like er­
ror and erasure correcting code to encode information bits to counter the synchronization 
problem caused by image-adaptive hiding. They also found that laser printers made use 
of ordered dithering halftoning algorithm to generate halftone patterns periodically and 
that the Fourier spectrum analysis of halftone patterns could be used to estimate the 
rotation angle that the image needed to be derotated with before the hidden data was
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decoded. For decoding, a hard decision decoding of embedding channel symbols was per­
formed. The disadvantage of their method is that the capacity of embedding information 
was still relatively low. Their derotation algorithm could also only be applied to laser 
printer.
In the above discussion we have focused on watermarking techniques that have attempted 
to address the challenge of achieving robustness even when dealing with printing-and- 
scanning attacks. Halftone images can exist as a result of printing-and-scanning but also 
as normal images themselves. In the next section, the authentication techniques related 
to halftone images will be reviewed.
3.2 D igital watermarking for halftone image authentication
Halftone image watermarking can be categorized into two groups. The first group [1,18, 
19,46] mainly concerns the approaches of data hiding in binary image format. However, 
they are not robust against any attacks, such as general image processing operations and 
desynchronization attacks. As such, their applications are somewhat limited.
In [1], Fu and Au proposed Data Hiding in halftone images generated by an Error Diffu­
sion (DHED) process. By self-toggling, the watermark was embedded in image locations 
generated by a pseudo-random number generator. A private key was required on the 
verifier side for retrieving the watermark. Their scheme was based on fragile watermark­
ing, so even with one bit of watermark changed, it could still detect unintentional or 
intentional tampering of the original image. However, fragile watermarking lacks the 
robustness towards tolerance of image modification such as geometric attacks, filtering 
and noise, unless Error Correction Coding (ECC), for example Bose, Chaudhuri and 
Hocquenghem (BCH) code, is incorporated [1].
In [18], Pan et al. proposed dividing a halftone image into blocks with each n x n  block 
consisting of a random combination of white and black pixels resulting in 2 ^^" similar 
pattern blocks. A Look-Up Table (LUT) was constructed for watermark embedding and 
extraction [18]. This LUT contained a combination of original blocks, their correspond­
ing pattern blocks and the frequency of original blocks occurrence. In the embedding
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process, the original block remained unchanged, if an embedded watermark bit was 0 . 
Otherwise, a similar pattern block would substitute the original block if a watermark 
bit of 1 was embedded. The LUT was also embedded into the original halftone image. 
For watermark generation, the MD5 hash function was employed to compute watermarks 
from the original halftone image. In the extraction process, the LUT was reconstructed to 
extract watermark. The hash digest was computed and compared with the extracted wa­
termarks. If they were equal, the halftone image was authentic. Otherwise, the halftone 
image was deemed to have been tampered with.
The second group focuses on incorporating watermark embedding into specific halftoning 
processes, such as direct binary search [47] and clustered-dot dithering [48,49]. In [47], 
Kacker and Allebach incorporated watermark embedding into halftoning process via a 
direct binary search. However, it is computationally inefficient for real time applications. 
Oztan and Sharma [49] embedded a limited amount of binary information in their con­
tinuous modulated halftone image by phase modulation and frequency modulation via 
a clustered-dot dithering algorithm. The embedded binary information was able to be 
detected from printed halftone image after scanning at the resolution of 1 2 0 0  dpi* 1 2 0 0  
dpi. A robustness against up to 5 degrees of rotation was reported by them during 
printing-and-scanning.
However, the watermark embedding capacity of all the techniques discussed in this section 
is relatively low. It has always been a performance trade-off between data embedding 
capacity and robustness in the design and implementation of watermarking schemes, 
while preserving the perceptual quality of the embedded halftone image. In Section 3.3, 
we present a novel linear gain model for preserving perceptual halftone image quality 
during error diffusion. The perceptual halftone image quality is evaluated and compared 
using different metrics with Fu and An’s approach [1 ].
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3.3 Least D istortion W atermarking for Halftone Images in 
Error Diffusion
As discussed in Chapter 2 , a halftone image can be produced from a greyscale image 
by error diffusion. This process introduces distortion. In error diffusion halftoning, a 
greyscale image is quantized into one bit pixel via an error diffusion kernel [50] [33]. 
As a consequence, it sharpens the image and adds quantization noise, resulting in some 
artifacts and idle tones. However, some artifacts and idle tones are incurred even without 
watermark embedding.
As discussed in Section 3.2, Fu and An’s DHED approach is relatively simple since it 
halftoned greyscale image generated by a standard error diffusion process and toggle the 
halftoned pixel value into watermark bit where the watermark was embedded. Their 
method embedded a watermark into a halftone image, and this introduced further dis­
tortion. The two processes of error diffusion and data hiding were separated in their 
method [1]. In this thesis, we propose to combine these processes so that the halftone 
algorithm is closely linked with data hiding. Therefore, we aim to reduce the distortion 
by having a single operation instead of two separate operations by proposing a water­
marking linear gain model to address optimum perceptual quality which can be preserved 
via minimizing distortion in the DHED process.
They also identified their own quality measurement of watermarked halftone image by 
using the Modified Peak Signal-to-Noise (MPSNR) ratio [1]. Kite et al. [50] proposed to 
use a Weighted Signal-to-Noise Ratio (WSNR) to measure error diffusion halftone images. 
In this chapter, we will analyse and perform quality evaluation of watermarked halftone 
image by WSNR, and also will compare with MPSNR. Furthermore, we propose the use
of the average power spectral density P S D  to measure the tonality of halftone images 
and watermarked halftone images, analogous to total harmonic distortion (THD) [51].
The rest of the sections are organized as follows: in Section 3.3.1, related work of halftone 
image watermarking in error diffusion is reviewed. In Section 3.3.2, we describe a halftone 
watermarking embedding process in error diffusion and how the distortion can be modeled 
and eliminated via an iterative linear gain model. In Section 3.3.3, an iterative linear
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gain halftoning embedding method is presented in details. In Section 3.3.4, we perform 
experiments to compare perceptual image quality of our proposed method to that of Fu 
and Au’s approach. The tonality problem is also analysed in this section. Finally, we 
summarise our work in Section 3.4.
3 .3 .1  R e la ted  W ork
As discussed in Chapter 2 , error diffusion is one of three commonly used halftoning algo­
rithms. Most of the data embedding methods use a standard error diffusion framework. 
Pei et al. [19] proposed a least-mean-square data hiding halftoning where the water­
mark was embedded into two or more halftone images by minimal-error bit searching 
and a LUT was used to retrieve the watermark. Wu et al. [52] proposed a mathemati­
cal framework to optimize watermark embedding to multiple halftone images where the 
watermark image and host images were regarded as input vectors. The watermark was 
then extracted by performing a binary logical operation ( i.e. XOR ) to multiple halftone 
images. Fu and Au’s DHED approach [1] divided an image into macro blocks with one 
bit of watermark embedded into each block. A halftone pixel was changed to an opposite 
value from 1  —)■ 0  or from 0  1 , if the embedded watermark was 0  or 1 , opposite to
the image value. The watermark was then retrieved simply by extracting embedding 
locations in the halftone image. This approach is relatively straightforward. However, as 
the embedding bits increase in each block, the same value pixels may cause clusters, i.e. 
regionally white pixels 1 or black pixels 0 will be grouped together. These clusters will 
degrade the overall image quality.
The methods [1,19,52] discussed above do not address the issue of distortion generated 
by data embedding. In this chapter we propose a method which takes into account the 
effects of the DHED halftoning process. Our proposed method minimizes the distortion to 
preserve perceptual quality of the embedded halftone image. In our experiments, we will 
compare our approach with Fu and Au’s [1] DHED approach through a detailed analysis 
of watermark embedding and perceptual quality for halftone images. In the following 
sections, we will analyse the halftone distortion in DHED, i.e., idle tone, sharpening and 
noise during the watermark embedding process of halftone images.
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3 .3 .2  S h arp en in g  D is to r tio n  in  D H E D
Knox [53] analysed the quantization error in halftoning at each pixel, by correlating it 
with the input image. He found that the quantization error was the key reason causing 
the tonality problem, appearing as annoying artifacts or worms. Although worms can 
be reduced, the sharpness of halftone increases as the correlation of the error image with 
the input image increases. Sharpening distortion affects the subjective quality of the 
halftone image [50]. However, toggling halftone pixels in data hiding error diffusion may 
increase the quantization errors. Thus, the perceptual quality of image cannot be easily 
preserved.
To better model a halftone quantizer in the standard error diffusion process as shown in 
Figure 3.1, Kite et al. [50] introduced a linear gain plus additive noise model, and applied 
it to an error diffusion quantizer. We summarise his model as follows:
Figure 3.1: Standard error diffusion process
Let x{i , j )  be the greyscale image input and e{i,j)  represents the quantization error 
caused by the quantizer output Q (x) minus the quantizer input x'{i, j).  H{z)  is the 
error filter which diffuses the quantization error into neighboring pixels. A standard 
error diffusion can be expressed as:
e{i,j)  =  yoihj)  -  
x '{i , j)  = x { i j )  -  h { i j )  X e { i j )
y o i h j )  =
(3.1)
(3.2)
(3.3)
The quantizer in standard error diffusion Q{x'{i,j))  can be modeled as
Q{x'{iJ)) = Kgx ' i i J )  + (3.4)
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where Kg (Ks G [1, oo)) is a linearization constant based on the uncorrelated white noise 
n(i , j )  assumption. The value of Kg at any pixel is given by the ratio of the output of 
the quantizer to its input. We need to first halftone an image and save the quantizer 
input. Then, we perform a least-squares fit of to yo(i,j)  by computing the value
of Kg that minimizes the squared error between halftone and halftone linear gain model 
outputs. This allows the visual quality of a halftone image to be preserved if Kgx'{i, j)  
approximates the halftone output, which can be expressed as follows:
j)  -  y o ( h j ) f  (3.5)
i j
Equations(3.4) and (3.5) will be true under the assumption of uncorrelated white noise 
of residual image.
In Section 3.2, we discuss the DHED approach which combines watermarking with error 
diffusion. Therefore, the linear gain of our model is not the same as Kg in [50]. We define 
a linear gain as K ^  in Figure 3.2 and the range of values for K ^  will be different to that 
of Kg. The precise relationship between Kg and Kyj is discussed in Section 3.3.2. Kite et 
al. also identified a multiplicative parameter L  to modify the original image, in order to 
control the sharpening distortion in standard error diffusion. This is referred as modified 
error diffusion. The modified error diffusion was used to derive the linear gain model 
in [50]. The modified error diffusion in [50] can be defined by Equations 3.6 to 3.9. To
Figure 3.2: data hiding error diffusion linear gain model
be consistent, in Equation 3.8, we use Lw as a multiplicative parameter which includes 
data hiding in correspondence with our linear gain Kyj. As a result of Equation 3.10, 
the value of y{i, j )  is not the same as the yo{i,j) in Equation 3.3. Therefore, y{i, j )  in 
Equation 3.10 includes information about watermarking self-toggling. We have already 
mentioned that the linear gain model can be equivalently used for the modified linear 
gain model K ^  with the relevant multiplicative parameter in DHED process which
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can be expressed by the following equations;
e{hj) =  y{h j)  - (3.6)
(3.7)
= x ' { i J )+ L y ,x { i , j ) (3.8)
yoihj) = (3.9)
2/ (b j) = R{yoihj)) (3.10)
where R{x)  in Equation (3.10) represents the watermarking self-toggle quantizer.
We substitute Kyjx'{i,j) into the quantizer output y{i, j )  as a data hiding error diffu­
sion linear gain model. By adjusting a multiplicative parameter the signal linear 
gain model output Kwx'{i ,j)  would approximate the watermarked halftone output i.e., 
minimizing the criterion given in Equation(3.5) and with replacing Kg- However, 
Kw cannot be estimated by the criterion as long as a watermarked halftone (y{i,j)) is 
obtained. However, we can map Kw to the standard halftone linear gain Kg as discussed 
in Section 3.3.2.
D e te rm in e  for D a ta  H id ing  E rro r  D iffusion
In this section, we derive the mapping from to Kg. We consider the embedding of 
watermark into a block-based halftoning process based on Fu and Au’s method. The 
watermark embedding locations are determined via a Gaussian random variable. As a 
result, the watermark sequences become white noise embedded into the halftone image. 
However, due to self-toggling, the watermark bit w{i , j)  (0 or 1) can change the pixels in 
the original halftone image at the selected embedding locations of the standard halftone 
output yo{i,j){ 1 or 0) in the cover image. We have developed the following two cases 
for the embedding procedure, as follows:
C ase 1: E m bedded  b it w{i, j)  = yo(b j)
Let linear gain K ^  represents data hiding error diffusion linear gain. The best case 
scenario is that all watermark bits equal to the standard halftone output 2/o(bi)- In this 
case, none of the pixels yo{i,j) will be toggled. We can simplify by taking Kyj =  Kg.
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Case 2: Em bedded bit ^  yo(hj)
The worst case scenario is that all standard halftone outputs yo(i,j) have to be changed. 
In this case, the watermarked halftone output y( i , j )  becomes 1 — yo(i , j) ‘ Our water­
marked error diffusion process is described in Equation (3.6) to Equation (3.10). We can
simplify Equation (3.10) as follows:
y(hJ)  = ~i--yo(i,j) (3.11)
By recalling Case 1 from Section 3.3.2 , to minimize Equation(3.5) for standard halftone 
linear gain Kg, we can derive Equation(3.12) with a small real number <^2 >  0
Kgx'(i , j )  -  yoihj)  = S2  (3.12)
By recalling Case 2 , and replacing y{i, j)  in the criterion given in Equation(3.5) with 
Equation(3.11), and assigning a small real value ^ 3  > 0, and relaxing the absolute value, 
we obtain
Kgx'{i,j)  4- yo{i,j) =  1 +  <5s (3.13)
By combining Equations(3.12) and (3.13), we obtain
2Kgx'{i,j)  =  1 +  ^ 2  +  <^3 (3.14)
We can derive the linear gain Kyj for data hiding error diffusion by mapping it to Kg. The
watermarking linear gain Kyjx'{i, j )  can be used to approximate the watermarked halftone 
output y{i,j).  It needs to minimize the squared error between the watermarked halftone 
and the linear gain model output. This can be achieved based on the criterion given in 
Equation(3.5). In DHED, the criterion given in Equation(3.5) can be approximated with 
an infinitely small real number > 0  for the watermarking linear gain model:
\Kyjx'{iJ)  -  y { i j ) \  = 6 1  (3.15)
By relaxing the absolute value of Equation (3.15) (we know watermarked halftone y{i, j )  € 
[0 , 1 ]) , we obtain
Kyjx'{i,j) = y{i, j )  +  (^1 (3.16)
Using Equation(3.14) and Equation(3.16), for halftone image l2/(«, j ) | <  1, we obtain
Kiux'{iJ) y { i j )  + 0 i
2Kgx' { i , j )  1 +  6 2  - b  (^3
< 1 (3.17)
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Therefore, we derive < 2Kg. The watermarked halftone linear gain can be represented 
by Kyj e  [Kgj 2Ks\. Here Kg can be estimated from a standard error diffusion kernel [50]. 
As mentioned previously Kyj cannot be obtained without first embedding a watermark. 
Each watermark embedded in a halftone image has an unique Kyj value to minimize 
— Therefore, we propose our new iterative linear gain model for
watermarking halftone images described in Section 3.3.3 by adjusting the optimum Kyj 
to minimize the above criterion.
3 .3 .3  I tera tiv e  L inear G ain  for W aterm ark in g  Error D iffu sion
In Section 3.3.2, we analysed the sharpening distortion in DHED. We combined Fu and 
Au’s DHED with the linear gain model of error diffusion, a linear gain Kyj was proposed to 
model the DHED process. We found that an increase in linear gain Kyj, would decrease 
the sharpening distortion. The sharpening distortion in DHED was controlled by a 
multiplicative parameter Ly,. By taking a Z-transformation in Equations (3.6-3.10), we 
obtain Equation (3.18)(detailed derivation of Equations can be found in Appendix A).
(3.18)
The above equation established the mapping from Kyj to Lyj.
In this section, we propose a visual quality preserving algorithm for data hiding error 
diffusion via iterative linear gain for watermarking halftone images. By adjusting the 
parameter Lyj to compensate the input image in data hiding halftoning, the sharpen­
ing distortion decreases as the correlation between original image and residual image 
decreases. Thus, we can obtain the least distortion watermarked halftone image by op­
timizing the perceptual image quality. Our proposed model is presented in Figure 3.3.
In order to evaluate their watermarked halftone image perceptual quality, Fu and Au 
proposed MPSNR [1]. For MPSNR calculation, the watermarked halftone image is passed 
through a Gaussian low-pass filter. It is then compared with an original greyscale image 
to calculate SNR. This results in the inaccurate calculation of SNR because errors are 
introduced as a result of high frequency components in the original greyscale image.
30 Chapter 3. Digital Watermarking for Halftone Image Authentication
To accurately measure a perceptual quality of a halftone image, Kite et.al [50] proposed 
the use of WSNR for the subjective quality measure of halftone images. The WSNR is a 
metric designed according to the contrast sensitivity function (CSF) of the human visual 
system. For an image of size M  x  N  pixels, WSNR is defined as
W S N R {dB )  = lOlogioC I (W) v ) - Y (w, v)C{u, v) |:r) (3.19)
where X{u ,v ) ,Y {u ,v ) ,  and C{u,v)  represent the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of 
the input image, output image, and CSF, respectively, where 0 < w < M  — 1 and 
0 < u < iV — 1. W ith WSNR, we optimize Kw to minimize the halftone watermarking 
image distortion. As discussed in Section 3.3.2, as Kw increases, the correlation between 
the residual error image and the input image decreases. We use an iterative approach 
to find the best Kw for the optimum WSNR during watermark embedding of halftone 
images. In Figure. 3.3, our proposed halftone embedding process can be explained as 
follows: The embedding process first divides an image into macro blocks. Each macro 
block embeds one bit. Toggling halftone pixels is the same as Fu and Au’s method [1] so 
that if the watermark bit is the same as the original halftone pixel, no action would be 
taken. If the watermark bit is different from the halftone pixel, then toggles it. Iteration 
starts from Kw = Kg to process embedding in halftone, and iterates by adding one 
additive amount 6 , i.e. h = 0.2 to Kw until the WSNR reaches the maximum.
Kw=Kw+b *-
Lw
NoQ(hainone)
Max(WSNR)
R(data hiding)
Figure 3.3: Iterative linear gain halftone embedding
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3 .3 .4  E x p er im en ts  and R e su lts  A n a lysis
As discussed previously, the sharpening distortion is caused by the correlation between 
the quantization/ residual error and the input image. From our experiments, we use the 
Jarvis kernel error diffusion on test image lena as an example to illustrate how Lw could 
be useful to reduce the correlation between the residual error image and input image. 
The residual error images (halftone - original) for Fu and Au’s method and our proposed 
method are illustrated in Figure 3.4.
(a) Lena image (b) Our proposed watermarked Lena 
image with 10080 bits embedded, 
J w ,=2.0771
a # ™ #
(c) Fu and A u’s m ethod residual error 
im age,corr=0.0238
(d) Our proposed m ethod’s residual 
error image,corr=0.0110,7t ^,=2.0771
Figure 3.4: Watermarked Halftone and Residual Error Images
For comparative analysis, both Fu and Au’s method and our proposed method embed-
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UNIVERSITY OF
Figure 3.5: University of Surrey Logo Image
ded the Surrey logo as shown in Figure 3.5 [54]. Figure 3.4(a) illustrates the original 
lena image and Figure 3.4(b) illustrates the watermarked halftone lena image based on 
our proposed method. Figure 3.4(c) shows the residual error image (embedded halftone 
- original) based on Fu and Au’s method. This residual image shows that the corre­
lation between the residual image with input image (corr=0.0238) during data hiding 
error diffusion. Figure 3.4(d) shows the residual image based on our proposed embed­
ding model. From Figure 3.4(d), we observe that the quantization error image in our 
proposed method (i.e. residual image) is approximately representing the Gaussian noise 
(corr=0.0110). The correlation value is decreased more significantly as compared with 
Fu and Au’s method. According to our experiments, the sharpness of the watermarked 
halftone image would decrease if the correlation was decreased.
The experiments were performed on five halftone images with different sizes of watermark 
(Surrey logo) embedded. Each experiment used the same locations for different sizes of 
watermark embedding. Figure 3.4(b) illustrates the lena halftone image with 10080 bits 
(90 X 112) embedded at 1^^=2.0771 with WSNR=27.3723 dB. The WSNR comparison 
between our method and Fu and Au’s method for different watermark sizes are given in 
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 respectively. The comparison of MPSNR is given in Table 3.3. 
From Table 3.2, our approach has an average improvement of 6.5% as compared to Fu 
and Au’s method. Based on MPSNR, our approach shows a slight improvement than 
Fu and Au’s method except for the Mandrill and Barbara images under high capacity 
embedding. The reason for this may be caused by the fact that both images Mandrill 
and Barbara contain more high frequency components.
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Table 3.1: WSNR Comparison Between Our Method and Fu and Au’s Method [1] (dB)
Watermark Size 32x32 64x64 90x90
Image Our method [1 ] Our method [1 ] Our method [1 ]
peppers 27.6430 25.2739 27.3807 25.1642 27.0737 25.0986
boat 27.5822 24.6748 27.5334 24.6736 27.2316 24.6095
barbara 27.2244 24.9237 27.1331 24.8252 26.7782 24.6693
lena 27.7292 26.0380 27.6181 25.9200 27.4492 25.8685
mandrill 27.2224 24.1162 27.0669 24.0947 26.9099 24.0768
Table 3.2: WSNR Comparison Between Our Method and Fu and Au’s Method [1] (dB)
Watermark Size 90x112 Avg. Improvement%
Image Our method [1 ] Our improvement
peppers 26.9365 25.0683 8.3920
boat 27.1121 24.5704 11.4701
barbara 26.5581 24.5850 8.7341
lena 27.3753 25.8303 6.5656
mandrill 26.9728 24.0051 12.4736
Table 3.3: MPSNR Comparison Between Our Method and Fu and Au’s Method [1] (dB)
Watermark Size 32x32 64x64 90x90 90x112
Image Our method [1 ] Our method [1 ] Our method [1 ] Our method [1 ]
peppers 27.1679 26.7294 26.9577 26.5666 26.7051 26.4292 26.6006 26.3275
boat 26.0481 25.7101 25.9650 25.6507 25.7326 25.4552 25.5981 25.4048
barbara 24.0952 24.0779 23.9976 23.9966 23.8437 23.8561 23.7716 23.7855
lena 27.0172 26.9169 26.8953 26.7834 26.7012 26.6531 26.6234 26.5605
mandrill 22.6196 22.7241 22.5810 22.6701 22.5051 22.6203 22.4630 22.5723
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Figure 3.6: WSNR of Fu and Au’s method vs Our method
Figure 3.6 illustrates the results of applying our proposed method and Fu and Au’s 
method data hiding error diffusion to five test images. From this figure, we conclude that 
our method can preserve the image quality of watermarked halftone images embedded 
with different sizes of watermark better than Fu and Au’s method in terms of WSNR 
evaluation. This is mainly due to our iterative linear gain effectively compensating the 
watermarking effects on the halftone error diffusion process. Figure 3.7 illustrates the 
improvement of our method as compared to the Fu and Au’s method. Even for the worst 
case image lena, our method achieved an improvement of approximately 6 % to 7% as 
compared to Fu and Au’s method. The other watermarked halftone images are shown in 
Figure 3.8.
So far we have presented our iterative linear gain model based on two image quality 
metrics, i.e., WSNR and MRS NR. A visual quality evaluation called visual infomiation 
fidelity (VIF) [55] was proposed for image quality assessment (QA) as given in Equation 
(3.20). VIF can be used to cpiantify the loss of image information to the distortion 
process and explores the relationship between image information and visual quality. We 
use it to compare the loss of image distortion between different watermarking halftone
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Figure 3.7: Percentage of improvement of our method
images. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 contain the VIF results for both Fu and An’s method and our 
method. These results show that our model achieves 11% to 23% improvement than Fu 
and Au’s method. It further indicates the effectiveness of our iterative linear gain model 
in data hiding error diffusion in order to achieve the least distortion image.
^  (subbands of wavelet coefficients in distorted image)
V I F  =
^  (subbands of wavelet coefficients in reference image) (3.20)
3 .3 .5  T on ality  V a lid ation  in  W aterm arked  H a lfton e  Im age
The error diffusion kernel causes directional artifacts or worms. The worms are the result 
of the quantization error being correlated with the original image. The worm artifacts are 
also known as idle tones. Idle tones occur when the system cycles periodically through a 
finite set of states for a constant input [50]. Idle tones affect the quality of halftone and 
they appear as strong cycle patterns in the images. Kite et.al [50] analogized the halftone 
distortion, which was caused by idle tone, with total harmonic distortion. By computing 
the power spectral density of watermarking halftone, we propose a novel method to
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(a) Our watermarked boat image, (b) Our watermarked peppers image, 
A u)=2 .514 A ui =2.435
(c) Our watermarked barbara (d) Our watermarked mandrill
image, A'„,=2.445 image, AT„, =2.532
Figure 3.8: Watermarked Halftone Images with Surreylogo 10080 bits embedded
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Table 3.4; VIF Comparison Between Our Method and Fu and Au’s Method [1]
Watermark Size 32x32 64x64 90x90
Image Our method [1 ] Our method [1 ] Our method [1 ]
peppers 0.2519 0.2165 0.2551 0.2125 0.2413 0.2066
boat 0.2534 0.2004 0.2467 0.1995 0.2407 0.1968
barbara 0.2494 0.2208 0.2411 0.2175 0.2336 0.2105
lena 0.2456 0.2108 0.2425 0.2092 0.2418 0.2044
mandrill 0.2242 0.1882 0.2250 0.1866 0.2227 0.1845
Table 3.5; VIF Comparison Between Our Method and Fu and Au’s Method [1]
Watermark Size 90x112 VIF comparison
Image Our method [1 ] Our method avg. [1 ] avg. Improvement (%)
peppers 0.2405 0.2075 0.2472 0.2108 17.2753
boat 0.2380 0.1959 0.2447 0.1981 23.5004
barbara 0.2306 0.2083 0.2387 0.2143 11.3768
lena 0.2345 0.2043 0.2411 0.2072 16.3821
mandrill 0 . 2 2 0 1 0.1838 0.2230 0.1858 20.0365
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measure the harmonic distortion [51]. The power spectral density (PSD) describes how
the power (or variance) of a time series is distributed with frequency. Mathematically, it
is defined as the Fourier Transform of the autocorrelation sequence of the time series. Let 
X be the signal of halftone image, the PSD is the Fourier transform of the autocorrelation 
function, mfrocorr(r), of the signal if the signal can be treated as a stationary random 
process,
/ oo autocorr{T)e'~‘^^'^^'^ dr. (3.21)
-OO
P S D =  [  " S { x ) d x +  [  ' S{x)dx.  (3.22)
JFi J-Fa
Where the power of the signal in a given fr equency band can be calculated in Equation 
(3.22) by integrating over positive and negative frequencies.
The spectral density is usually estimated using Welch’s method [56], where we define a 
Hann window to sample the signal x. We also define the average PSD under a Hamming 
window of 512 samples (two-side 256 sample dots) as
1P S D  = — P S D  (3.23)
For our experiments, we use the Jarvis error diffusion kernel and embed a Surrey logo
(90x112 bits) into the test image boat of sizes 512x512 as an example. For P S D  com­
parison, we analysed the tonality of our proposed watermarking model with Fu and Au’s
method. The PSD s  of image boat are illustrated in Figure 3.9. As discussed in Sec­
tion 3.3.2, our proposed linear gain model reduces the tonality of watermarked halftone 
image by adjusting Kyj. From Figure 3.9, Fu and All’s method (star line) generates a
higher P S D  than the original halftone (triangle line). However, our method (JFw=2.5136)
achieves a much smoother P S D  than the others. The same experiments are performed
on all five images, and average power spectral density (PSD)  are evaluated for the im­
ages, as shown in Table 3.6. The K^, in Table 3.6 represents the initial value of Kyj 
and the last Kw^  is the optimum value of Km. We found the halftone image peppers
has zero PSD .  This means the autocorrelation function of this image is zero but after 
watermark embedding, it introduces a certain amount of harmonic distortion. For the
halftone image peppers, the P S D  obtained was 0.0096 (dB/Hz) for both Fu and Au’s
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Figure 3.9; Average Power Spectral Density of halftone boat images 
method and our proposed method. We also found that our method provided an overall
P S D  decrease for the five images, as Ku, continued to increase until it reached near
For example, image boaVs P S D  reduced from 0.0893 (dB/Hz) (AT^ ,=1.1136) to 0.0096 
(dB/Hz)(A:^*=2.5136).
Based on this analysis, we conclude that if P S D  decreases and is more uniformly dis­
tributed, the harmonic distortion also decreases. By finding an optimum a less 
distorted watermarked halftone image is obtained. Therefore, an optimum perceptual 
quality is preserved via minimizing distortion in data hiding error diffusion of halftone 
images.
3.4 Summary
We analysed the perceptual quality of watermarking embedding in the error diffusion 
of halftone images. Two main distortions resulting from data hiding error diffusion of 
halftone images have been identified: sharpening distortion and uneven tonality distri­
bution. We proposed a linear gain model to minimize the distortions in data hiding
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Table 3.6: Average Power Spectral Density
Image Standard Halftone Fu and Au method Our Proposed Method (dB/Hz)
peppers 0 0.0096 0.0096(Ffi=1.0346) 0.0096(7TJ^=2.4346)
boat 0.1053 0 . 1 1 2 2 0.0893(7^=1-1136) 0.0096(7f^=2.5136)
barbara 0.2225 0.2185 0.2153(7s:i=1.0454) 0.1071(7fy=2.4454)
lena 0.0535 0.0521 0.0507(7^=1.0771) 0.0099(7^^=2.4771)
mandrill 0.1796 0.1914 0.1632(7fi=1.1315) 0.0322(7T^=2.5315)
error diffusion halftoning process and derived our optimized linear gain parameter 
by mapping it to the halftoning linear gain model Kg.
This model reduced a significant amount of distortion resulting in 6.5% to 12% improve­
ment of WSNR and 11% to 23% improvement of VIF, as compared to Fu and Au’s 
method. It resulted in an embedded halftone image to be unsharpened and its quanti­
zation error became an uncorrelated Gaussian noise. This model adapted an iterative 
approach to minimize the impacts of distortion in the data hiding error diffusion pro­
cess. The proposed linear gain control model was also validated using an average power 
spectral density.
Chapter 4
R obust H ashing for Image 
A uthentication
Image authentication techniques can be categorized into digital watermarking based 
schemes and image hashing based schemes [12,13]. A digital watermarking impercepti­
bly embeds a message into an image. On the contrary, an image hashing is an intrinsic 
technique that extracts particular features from an image, thus it does not cause any 
modification to the image. An image hashing is content-based representation of an im­
age, and it can be found in the application of image retrieval in literature.
This chapter proposes a novel secure and robust image hashing based on Scale Invari­
ant Feature Transform (SIFT) [57] local descriptor, which is called secure SIFT-based 
Hashing (SSH). The proposed scheme employs the invariant properties of SIFT that 
contribute significantly to the robustness of image hashing. It is found to be not only ro­
bust to print-and-scan, but also resilient to common image processing operations, which 
include non-geometric and geometric distortions. The proposed SSH-hash scheme out­
performs the existing feature-based image hashing schemes, such as SVD-based hashing 
(SVD-hash) [20] and Feature-Point based hashing (FP-hash) [10].
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4.1 Introduction
The development of imaging technologies has grown significantly in the past decades. 
The manipulation of images by digital editing tools is becoming relatively straightfor­
ward. The act of printing an image is considered to be a digital-to-analogue process. 
It is feasible to reproduce a new digital representation of the analogue printout using a 
scanner, which is an analogue-todigital process. The print-and-scan is considered as a 
signal transformation process between the digital domain and the analogue domain. This 
process introduces distortions even though the content of image remains unchanged after 
print-and-scan. Therefore, it is important to develop an image authentication scheme 
robust to printing and scanning.
In the literature, digital watermarking and robust image hashing are two popular tech­
niques that have been extensively developed for image authentication. Digital water­
marking refers to the process of imperceptibly embedding a message into a cover media 
according to an embedding algorithm, which allows the embedded message to be ex­
tracted from an embedded media after it is transmitted over a channel. In [58], Solanki 
et al. proposed a watermark embedding in images that could be resilient to print-and-scan 
process. The low-frequency coefficients of the discrete Fourier transform were selected for 
embedding watermarks of several hundred information bits. A de-rotation method was 
proposed to automatically estimate rotation angles by exploiting the knowledge of the 
digital halftoning algorithms particularly employed by laser printers. The limitations of 
this approach is that it is only applicable to images printed by laser printers. If printing 
an image on an inkjet printer instead of a laser printer, the automatic rotation estimation 
may not be performed. It is also noted that the de-rotation method cannot be applied to 
a general digital rotation attack, i.e., the image is rotated digitally, since the de-rotation 
method is based on the observation of the relation between the periodicity of the printed 
halftone dots in the spatial domain and the frequency domain.
Another issue related to digital watermarking based schemes is the perceptual quality 
degraded by the watermark embedding. In order to preserve the perceptual quality, the 
embedded capacity is limited to a few hundred bits [58]. For smooth images with low 
frequency components, the embedded capacity will be even lower. Therefore, for digi-
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tal watermarking based image authentication in print-and-scan, watermark embedding 
capacity impacts the robustness of watermarking. The perceptual quality of embed­
ded images is inevitably restrained by the watermarking capacity. It would be difficult 
to meet the robustness and imperceptibly for digital watermarking based authentication 
under print-and-scan. In this chapter, we propose an image hashing based authentication 
robust to print-and-scan and general image manipulation attacks.
The concept of image hashing [8 ] is a content-based digital signature but it does not 
conform to cryptographic hashing. In cryptography, the message is verified by the cryp­
tographic hash function, which is key dependent and sensitive to every bit of the message 
content, such as SHA-1, HMAC, and MD5. Unless every bit of the message is unchanged, 
the message is not considered authentic. However, for image authentication, the defini­
tion of integrity is different. As long as the content delivered by an image is visually 
unchanged, the image is considered as authentic. During an image transmission and pro­
cessing operation, it will undergo different types of distortions, such as filtering, noise, 
rotation, scaling and cropping. The distorted version of image should still be considered 
as authentic as the original image, since they are both perceptually similar. Therefore, 
image authentication techniques have to be resilient towards considerable distortions 
involved in print-and-scan process. In this process, an image is distorted, caused by 
the changes of pixel values and geometric displacement. The geometric displacement 
is caused by a mixture of rotation, scaling and cropping (RSC) [59]. Although these 
distortions do not cause any perceptual differences to images, but provide a significant 
challenge to image authentication algorithms.
In the literature, an image hashing is typically composed of feature extraction and com­
pression [8 ]. A set of features are extracted fiom an image by a secret key, which is 
followed by compressing the features into a shorter length to generate the final hash. 
The hash is transmitted via a secure channel or an authentication server to a verifier. 
At the authentication end, the verifier uses the same secret key to generate the hash to 
compare with the transmitted hash or the hash stored in the database. A typical image 
hashing based authentication process [9] is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Ideally, perceptually 
indistinguishable images should return similar hash values, whereas perceptually differ­
ent images should return distinct hash values based on some measurement metrics such
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as Euclidean or Normalized Hamming Distance (NHD). Furthermore, the security of an 
image hashing is addressed by introducing the randomness of the hash, and the use of a 
secret key. Without the knowledge of the secret key, it is computationally infeasible for 
an attacker to generate the hash values [12,13,60,61].
Image Hash
Key
Candidate
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Transmitted
Hash
Yes
AuthenticSam e?
No
Generate
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Feature
Extraction
Generate
Hash
Feature
Extraction
Not
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Figure 4.1: Image authentication based on Hashing
The image hashing has been investigated by a number of schemes [9] [10] [8 ] [61] [20] [2 1 ] 
[2 2 ], which can be divided into four categories: (1 ) random patch based image hashing; 
For example, Fridrich and Goljan [61] proposed to use zero-mean random smooth patterns 
to generate the hash, and Venkatesan et al. [8 ] generated the hash by calculating the mean 
and variance of random tiled image blocks. These statistics based approaches are robust 
to JPEG operation, filtering and noises but they fail to forgery attacks as indicated in [9] ; 
(2) Transform-based image hashing, such as Singular Value Decomposition image hashing 
(SVD-hash) [20], Non-negative Matrix Factorization image hashing (NMF-hash) [62], and 
Fourier-Mellin Transform image hashing (FMT-hash) [9]; In [20], Kozat et al. applied 
a SVD lower-rank matrix to approximate the image, but their SVD-hash was not robust 
to rotation and shearing attacks. In [62], Monga et al. proposed to use a non-negative 
matrix factorization to perform dimensional reduction for image hashing, but the NMF- 
hash was only robust up to 20 degrees of rotation. In [9], Swaminathan et al. mapped
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the magnitude of 2D Fourier transformation from an image into polar coordinates to 
generate the hash. This approach was robust to geometric attacks but was not invariant 
to scaling [63]; (3) Feature-Point based image hashing (FP-hash); In [10], Monga et 
al. proposed visual significant feature points for image hashing. This scheme was too 
sensitive to content changing manipulations. Therefore, false positive rates (FPR) were 
relatively high for rotation, cropping, and shearing attacks; (4) Distributed source coding 
based image hashing [2 1 , 2 2 ]; the image authentication was generalized as a channel 
coding problem. It required supervised distortion channel modeling and not suitable for 
unknown distortion channel, such as print-and-scan.
FP-hash [10] is an attractive approach due to the inherent sensitivity to content changing 
manipulations. However, the approach in [10] only uses a limited number of invariant 
feature points to preserve the image content. It is not sufficient to detect local image 
manipulations. To detect local image manipulation, such as in print-and-scan channel, 
we adapt the SIFT local descriptor [57] for our proposed SSH-hash algorithm in this 
chapter. SIFT feature keypoints were originally developed for object recognition [57]. 
They have also been used for face authentication [64], fingerprint verification [65] and 
image forensics [66,67].
In order to achieve the performance trade-off between robustness and fragility of image 
hashing, we propose a few key steps: 1 ) an image is normalized by a geometric transforma­
tion process invariant to any affine distortions; 2) SIFT feature is extracted in randomly 
selected image blocks instead of an entire image; 3) in each of selected image block, SIFT 
features are generated by randomly selected scale-space and orientation parameters; 4) 
SIFT feature vectors are binarized by a logistic regression based dimensionality reduction 
in order to generate the hash value of a fixed length, i.e., a few hundred bits.
The remaining of sections are organized as follows: Section 4.2 reviews related image 
hashing algorithms. Section 4.3 presents our proposed SSH-hash, where we address our 
adaptation of SIFT to image hashing application by random projection and binarization 
of feature space to Hamming space. Experiments and result analysis are presented in 
Section 4.4. We evaluate the robustness and fragility/discriminability of the proposed 
SSH-hash by comparing to SVD-hash and FP-hash with 12 image content preserving
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attacks, including print-and-scan. Finally, Section 4.5 presents our summary.
4.2 Related Work
Early image hashing schemes [68,69] were typically statistics-based, such as using mean, 
variance and moments, as feature vectors. Venkatesan et al. proposed an image hashing 
algorithm based on the averages and variances of wavelet coefficients calculated in ran­
domly tiled image blocks [8 ]. Reed-Muller error-correction code was initially proposed 
to compress the image statistics based feature vectors. Similarly, Fridrich et al. [61] pro­
posed an image hashing scheme by projecting an image onto zero-mean random smooth 
patterns. The smooth pattern was generated from a low-pass filtered matrix with uni­
formly distributed random entries controlled by a secret key. The image hashing schemes 
proposed in [8 ] and [61] were generally based on image statistics of randomly projected 
image blocks, such as mean and variance. The image statistics based image hashing has 
shown to provide robustness under a small amount of image operations, such as JPEG 
compression, filtering and noise. However, it was not robust to a wide range of other at­
tacks such as general affine transforms, cropping and print-and-scan. Furthermore, even 
though the security of these hashing schemes was assisted by randomizing the features, 
which was determined by a secret key, they were vulnerable to forgery attack as shown 
in [9].
In [10], Monga and Evans proposed an image hashing scheme based on a low level image 
feature by using an end-stopped wavelet transform. The scheme achieved a good robust­
ness against malicious attacks and general image processing manipulations. However, it 
is well-known that one of the major drawbacks of DWT is their lack of invariance to the 
shifting of the input signal due to the dyadic structure of the wavelet expansions [59]. For 
two dimensional input signals/images, 2D-DWT coefficients are also sensitive to orien­
tation / rotational changes; that is, the same images with different orientations may have 
different wavelet coefficients. Due to separability of the filters, the separable 2D-DWT 
is strongly oriented in the horizontal and vertical directions. This makes it difficult to 
extract rotation-invariant features from the wavelet coefficients.
Compared with the hashing schemes proposed in [8,61], the image hashing schemes based
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on Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) [20] and Fourier-Mellin Transform (FMT) [9] 
have shown to have good robustness to geometric attacks. In [20], SVD was used to find 
the best approximation of an image using lower dimensions. An image hashing based 
on lower-rank matrix approximations was proposed. The hash value was obtained from 
the singular vectors corresponding to the largest singular values. While this method 
achieved good robustness against geometric attacks, however, it reconstructed an image 
by a coarse representation. Therefore, it resulted in a significant false positive rate, i.e., 
the hash values of two distinct images were difficult to be differentiated [13]. In order to 
avoid this drawback, a large rank approximation of the matrix could be used instead of a 
lower rank. However, the robustness of image hashing would be reduced. Consequently, 
it would also increase the hash length.
In [9], Swaminathan et al. developed an image hashing based on extracting features 
from FMT. The invariant feature was generated by a circular summation of 2-D Fourier 
transform magnitudes. However, the robustness to scaling attack in [9] was less than 
expected. Derrode and Ghorbel proved that FMT was not invariant to scaling, and a 
normalization factor was derived in order to correct the scaling effect [63]. The image 
hashing schemes proposed in [20] and [9] shared a similarity that the basis vectors 
of the transform, for example SVD or FMT, were randomly permuted to generate the 
corresponding feature. The randomization of feature generation was dependent on a 
secret key, which minimized the information leakage to an adversary as indicated in [2 0 ].
SIFT feature points have already demonstrated to have good robustness and efficiency in 
face authentication [64], fingerprint verification [65] and image forensic applications [6 6 , 
67]. The latest work on multiple region copy-move forgery detection was proposed in [67], 
which was an extension of the work proposed in [6 6 ]. This work focused on copy-and- 
move attack, i.e., an area of an image was cloned onto anther zone of the image. This 
method detected clusters of keypoints belonging to cloned areas. The advantage of this 
method was that it introduced a generalized 2NN test for multiple keypoints matching, 
since traditional 2NN matching could only identify the keypoints that were very different 
from the rest, that were obtained via a global threshold. The generalized 2NN test 
iteratively compared the ratio between the distance of the closest neighbour to that 
of the second-closest neighbour with a threshold to determine the match of inspected
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keypoints. To identify the cloned areas of an image, a clustering procedure was used to 
merge the spatial nearest keypoints to the same areas. Amerini et al. [67] also estimated 
the possible geometric transformation between the original area and copy-move attacked 
area by using a RANdom SAmple Consensus algorithm (RANSAC) to estimate the affine 
transformation parameters.
Similar to Amerini et aVs work [67], our proposed image hashing method will be based 
on SIFT feature descriptors. However, to avoid the complex parameter estimation in 
the affine transformation, we use a normalization procedure to align the image before 
the feature extraction. In this chapter, we discuss image hashing and its robustness to 
print-and-scan. We use random projection and binarization of SIFT feature vector to 
generate final binary string for normalized Hamming distance calculation.
The aim of SIFT binarizations is to reduce the storage consumption, and at the same 
time speed up the matching without loss of recognition performance. Compared to ex­
isting SIFT binarization schemes in the literature, such as LDAhash [70], SURF [71] and 
BRIEF [72], our proposed hash algorithm performs a dimensionality reduction to SIFT 
feature vectors of an image, i.e, to map the high-dimension vector of float value to a 
one-dimension vector of binary value in a fixed length. Current literature [70,72] only re­
ported the quantization of every float value of SIFT descriptor vector into binary string, 
i.e., to map the high-dimension SIFT feature vector of float value to a high-dimension 
SIFT feature vector of binary value. Also the number of SIFT features found varies from 
image to image. For an image, their SIFT features can save storage cost due to the vec­
tor of 128-dimensional binary values. However, this is still significant for image hashing 
based authentication that requires very few bits or bytes to carry content information.
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4.3 Image hashing based on SIFT local descriptors
4 .3 .1  E x tra c tin g  G eom etr ic  Invariant F eatures
In print-and-scan process, the operation of an image transform will give rise to a number 
of geometric distortions. To provide an authentication of a printed-and-scanned image 
using robust image hashing, the features representing the printed-and-scanned image 
should have a certain amount of invariance to image scaling, rotation and illumination. In 
addition, the features should be highly distinctive, so that it can distinguish perceptually 
different images.
In this chapter, we adapt the use of the Scale Invariant feature Transform (SIFT) [57] 
for image hashing [10]. SIFT feature points are based on texture analysis of the entire 
scale space, it has been shown to provide good robustness to distortions that cause the 
deformation of an image under print-and-scan.
A daptation of SIFT algorithm  to  Im age H ashing
SIFT was developed by Lowe [57] for image feature generation. It has been widely used 
for image retrieval and object recognition applications. The SIFT features are extracted 
from scale invariant space robust to image translation, scaling, rotation, and partially 
invariant to illumination changes. SIFT algorithm can be summarized by four steps: 
(1) scale-space keypoint detection; (2) keypoint localization; (3) assignment of canonical 
orientations; and (4) generation of keypoint descriptors.
Given an image / ,  SIFT features can be detected at different scales a. Firstly, the image 
I  is convolved with Gaussian smoothing filter and the difference of Gaussian (DoG) for 
successive Gaussian-blurred images is taken for keypoints. Specifically, a DoG image D  
is given by:
D{x, y, cr) =  L{x, y, h a )  -  L{x, y, kja)  (4.1)
where L{x ,y ,ka)  is the convolution of the original image I (x ,y )  with Gaussian blur
kernel G{x,y ,ka)  at scale ka, and k is a constant multiplicative factor, i.e.,
D{x, y, a) = (G{x, y, h a )  -  G{x, y, kja))  * I{x, y). (4.2)
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Once DoG images have been obtained, the keypoints are defined as local minima or max­
ima of the DoG image across scale-spaces. The keypoints are determined by comparing 
each pixel in the DoG images to its 8  neighbours at the current scale and 9 neighbouring 
pixels in the scale above and the scale below. The candidate keypoint is selected only if 
it is larger than all of these neighbours or smaller than all of them. To achieve invariance 
to rotations, the SIFT algorithm assigns each keypoint a canonical orientation 9. For 
each sample of Gaussian smoothed image L{x,y),  the gradient magnitude M{x^y)  and 
orientation 9{x, y) can be calculated using pixel differences as expressed in Equation 4.3.
A orientation histogram is computed based on the gradient of samples in a region around 
each of the keypoint. There are 36 bins in the orientation histogram, covering 360 degree 
range of orientations. Each sample of the histogram is weighted by its gradient magnitude 
and by a Gaussian-weighted circular window with a  equal to 1.5 times w.r.t the scale 
of the keypoint. The peaks in the orientation histogram correspond to the dominant 
orientations, which are assigned to the keypints. The SIFT descriptor is computed based 
on the factors of the location of each of keypoints, the canonical orientation and the scale 
of Gaussian-smoothed image ( which is used to selected the keypoint).
M{x,y)  = {{{L{x + l ,y )  -  L { x - l , y ) Ÿ  (4.3)
+  {L{x,y +  1 ) - L { x , y - 1 ) Ÿ Ÿ ^ ^
6{x,y) =  atan2{L{x,y + 1) (4.4)
— L{x,y  — l),L{x-{-l^y)  — L{x — l ,y))
Since the scale factor that determines the DoG images impacts the detection of the
keypoints in an image, it is usually focused on the keypoints of objects. It is therefore
no longer suitable for image hashing based authentication, since it concerns the integrity 
of an image content including as much as information coming from both the objects and 
backgrounds. By adapting SIFT descriptor into image hashing based authentication, 
SIFT keypoints are extracted in randomly selected image blocks. For each selected block, 
the SIFT descriptor is computed using a randomly scale factor and a random canonical 
orientation, which are obtained from a predefined range. However, due to the random 
selection of canonical orientation, the rotation invariance cannot be preserved. To avoid
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this drawback, we introduce a normalization procedure to an image before the SIFT 
feature extraction process.
In our image hashing algorithm, an image is first divided into size of 8  x 8  blocks. A SIFT 
descriptor is then computed using a scale factor and canonical orientation in each of the 
image blocks, all randomly selected. The gradient magnitude at each sample point in a 
16x16 samples region around the keypoint is then calculated. The magnitudes are further 
weighted by a Gaussian window with a equal to one half the width of the descriptor 
window. These magnitudes are then accumulated into orientation histograms over 4 x 4  
subregions. There are eight directions for each orientation histogram. Therefore, a SIFT 
descriptor is formed b y a 4 x 4 x 8  =  128 elements feature vector for each image block. 
This vector is then normalized into unit length to enhance invariance to afhne changes 
in illumination [57].
The 128-dimensional SIFT vector can be used for patten recognition, via an Euclidean- 
distance comparison between the 128-dimensional feature vectors. However, it is very 
complex and computationally intensive resulting in a low matching speed and a high 
storage cost for large-scale image authentication process. Moreover, the security is also 
an important issue [6 6 ]. One may delete feature points, which would result in high 
false positive rate. The authentication of an image is based on a bit-size comparison 
between binarized feature vectors. The use of normalization in our image hashing would 
align the geometric distorted print-and-scan image. Therefore, it can reduce the de- 
synchronization of binarized SIFT feature vector for a bit-wise comparison.
N orm alization
Image pixels can be distorted under image transformations, such as print-and-scan, ro­
tation and cropping. W ithout synchronization, feature binary-bit sequences are mis­
matched if using XOR operations. Therefore, the use of similarity metrics such as NHD 
for these feature sequences will not be valid. Perfect synchronization of two images in 
image hashing is not possible because at the time of the generation of image hashing, 
there does not exist another authentic image. By using SIFT features, we only need 
to have relatively weak synchronization because SIFT features are invariant to image
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scaling and rotation, and partially invariant to change in illumination [57].
The normalization procedure proposed by Dong et al. [73] in image watermarking is 
adapted for the synchronization in our image hashing scheme. The normalized image 
was robust against general affine transformation attacks. Their normalization procedure 
addressed affine transformation, allowing shearing in the X and Y directions rather than 
simple scaling and rotation. The rotation, scaling, and translation (RST) are treated as 
special cases of affine transforms. For an image I{x ,y)  of size M  x N ,  the geometric 
moments mpq is defined in Equation (4.5), and central moment Pp,q,p,q = 0 ,1 ,2 ,... is 
defined in Equation (4.6) respectively.
M - l  N - 1
^V^(2^,2/) (4.5)
x = 0  y = 0  
AI—1 N —1
f^pQ= X )  X  ~  -  ÿ y i { x ,  y) (4.6)
x = 0  2/=0
where
$ =  =  ^  (4.7)
moo Mioo
An image g{x,y)  is affine transformed version of image I{x,y) ,  with a transformation 
( S I Z )  and vector d =  (*]matrix A = ° " ° "   t    ^M, such that g{x,y) = I{xa,ya), where
The transformation matrix A can be considered into three different affine transforms, 
which includes
• shearing in the x direction, where A = (q j) =  Ax
• shearing in the y direction, where A  =  (^ j) =  Ay
• scaling in both x and y directions, where A =  (q^) =
Therefore, any affine transform A can be considered as a combination of these three 
transforms, i.e., A =  A^ , - A^ - A&. The normalization procedure proposed in [73] consists 
of 4 steps as described in [73]. This normalization procedure integrates the general affine
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transformation that can be modeled as a combination of translation, shearing in the x 
direction and in the y direction, scaling in the x direction and in the y direction. Each of 
the normalization steps aims to eliminate each type of distortions. Step 1 eliminates the 
translation by shifting the centre of the normalized image at the density centre of the 
affine attacked image. Steps 2 and 3 eliminate the shearing in both x and y directions, 
respectively. Step 4 resizes the normalized image into a standard size. The determination 
of parameters related to transformation matrix Ax Ay and Ag, i.e., /3, 7 , a  and Ô are 
resolved in [73]. Since shearing transformation matrix Ax defined in [73] allows the 
affine image shears clockwise and anticlockwise at x direction, i.e., /3 G (—00, + 00), the 
resulting normalized image rotates at a particular angle 6, as given in Equation 4.8:
« 4  (0,90”) i f ^ e (0 ,+ o o ) ,
^ (—90°,0) i f /3 G (—00,0).
In order to satisfy the synchronization of the affine transformed image with the origi­
nal image, we unify the resulting normalized image rotated clockwise at x direction by 
defining shearing matrix Âx =  In this case, the resulting normalized image only
rotates at an angle of 6, where 6 G (0,90°) as shown in Figure 4.2(b). Therefore, we 
complete our final normalization procedure by Step 5.
• Step 5: We estimate the rotation angle 9 by Equation (4.9). We then de-rotate the 
normalized image by the estimated angle 9. The final resulting normalized image 
is defined by l 5 {x,y).
Y
9 =  arctan — (4.9)
After the normalization procedure of the 4 steps proposed in [73] and our proposed Step 
5, an affine transformed image will be normalized into a calibrated image as shown in 
Figure 4.2(c).
4 .3 .2  R an d om  P r o jec tio n  and  B in a r iza tio n
The process of image hashing consists of two steps: (1) random projection of SIFT feature 
vectors using a secret key K\;  (2) feature dimension reduction. In order to provide
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(a) Original Image (b) Normalized Image in [73] (c) Our Calibrated Normalized
Image
Figure 4.2: Image Normalization
good discriminative characteristics of image hashing, random projection is achieved by 
generating SIFT feature vector in a limited number of randomly selected image blocks. 
We demonstrate the generation of SIFT features for images as shown in Figure 4.3. We 
randomly selected 500 blocks for computing the SIFT feature vectors located at the 
central pixel of each block. Prior to the SIFT computation, both the original image 
and its printed-and-scanned image are normalized following the procedure defined in 
Section 4.3.1. The SIFT features computed in each image consist of 500x128 dimensional 
float values. By using nearest neighbour computation, the keypoints of the two images 
can be matched with minimum Euclidean distance for the SIFT feature vector. As 
shown in Figure 4.3, 491 features of keypoints are matched between an image and its 
printed-and-scanned version. However, the image hashing will use the Hamming distance 
metric to measure the dissimilarity of two images. This hashing requires the SIFT 128 
dimensional space to be reduced to one dimension. For the images shown in Figure 4.3, 
the SIFT feature vector computed in each of the images would be 500 bits, instead of 
500x128 float values. The authentication of the two images will be the Hamming distance 
between the two binary strings of length 500.
Here, we generalize the problem as follows: given a set of features F  =  {x i ,X 2 , 
where Xi G W' , we need to find a binarization of function H  : -4 { — 1,1}^. The
main idea is to flnd a mapping from the feature space to the Hamming space by means 
of affine map with a sign function such that the Hamming distance for similar images is
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SIFT m a tc h e s  (491 fe a tu re s)
N orm alized Original Im age N orm alized  P rin tS ca n n ed  Im age
Figure 4.3: Two Image Feature Matches
close to zero [70].
To generalize the affine mapping, a m  x L  affine matrix is first constructed and denoted 
as P . Let Si be the ith  row sum of the affinity matrix P  [74]:
(4.10)
Then normalizing P by Si gives us S. We use a logistic regression model [75], to generate 
binarization of the projected feature vector F,  i.e. the embedding of a descriptor x to 
Hamming space H  that can be expressed as an L-dimensional binary string:
y =  ««gn(X S j X j ) (4.11)
where y G {—1,1}. This mode is equal to the model that uses the logistic function 
/(a;) =  1 / ( 1  +  e“^), which transforms a real-valued input into a value between 0  and 
1 |75|:
1
P { Y  =  - 1 1 * , 4 )  =  1  -  P ( Y  =  I K  4 )
(4.12)
(4.13)
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The Hamming bit extraction approach uses random projection that preserves the local 
sensibility of geometric characteristics [76]. Another explanation of bit extraction is seen 
in [77] using L-random hyperplanes to partition feature vectors to generate bit sequences. 
The secure hashing bit can be randomly permuted by a secret key K 2 - Two hashing bits 
match with probability is proportional to the SIFT vector values. For similar images, the 
SIFT vectors aie similar because of having nearest Euclidean distance. Therefore, the 
Hamming distance of similar images could be expected to be within a certain threshold. 
We observe that the robustness of SIFT descriptors and the high dimension nature of 
the problem ensure the false positive rate to be relatively low.
4.4 Experim ents and Performance Analysis
4 .4 .1  E x p er im en t S e ttin g s
A number of experiments will be performed to evaluate the robustness and overall statis­
tical performance of our proposed algorithm. Our image database contains 50 greyscale 
images selected from the uncompressed colour image database (UCID) [78], which is 
widely used for benchmarking a variety of imaging applications, such as steganogra- 
phy, image forensics and image compression. The test images together with their 12 
attacked versions of images provide a database of 5150 images in total, within which 
there are 350 printed-and-scanned images. The content-preserving attacks are generated 
by the Multimedia Content-based Fingerprinting (MCBF) Toolbox [23], which was de­
veloped to evaluate image hashing algorithms. The test images are of various sizes but 
have been resized into the same size of 512 x 512 pixels. Two state-of-the-art hashing 
algorithms related to feature-based image authentication schemes are simulated and com­
pared with our SIFT-based hashing (SSH), including SVD-SVD hashing (SVD-hash) [20] 
and Feature-point hashing (FP-hash) [10].
The parameter settings for each hashing algorithm are as follows: our hash (SSH) selects 
8 x 8  non-overlapping blocks to extract SIFT feature vectors with 8  scale-spaces starting 
from 3.2986 and 8  orientations starting from 7t / 4 . Each feature vector uses a randomly 
selected scale and a randomly selected orientation by a secret key /C3 . The feature vector
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Table 4.1: Types of Image Processing Operations
Attack Attacking Parameters No. of Images
A d d itiv e  N oise
Gaussian Noise Variance =0-2.4, 9 levels 450
F ilte rin g  O p era tio n s
Median filtering Filter Size=l-80, 9 levels 450
Average Filtering Filter Size=l-40, 6  levels 300
Gaussian blur Filter Size=l-80, 9 levels 450
Sharpening Filter o=0.1:0.9, 9 levels 450
Illumination correction 75%-125%, 9 levels 450
G eom etric  D is to rtio n s
Cropping 5%-15%, 9 levels 450
Rotation Degree 1-10, 9 levels 450
Scaling 50%-150%, 9 levels 450
Shearing 5%-15%, 9 levels 450
L um inance  N on-L inearities 
JPEG compression Quality factor 10-99% 450
P rin t-an d -sc an Printer labels 1-7 350
T ota l 5150
length L is 1024 bits. The 11 image manipulation attacks and one print-and-scan attack 
are defined in Table 4.1.
In SVD-hash, an image is represented by a sequence of rectangles [20]. The number of 
rectangles is 25 and the size of rectangle is 120 x 120 pixels. We use uniform quantization 
to quantize the SVD intermediate hash into 1060 binary bits. In FP-hash [10], we use 
the default setting by selecting 64 feature points per image. The generated feature point 
is also uniformly quantized into the hashing length of 1024 bits. All the experiments 
are performed using Matlab 2010b on a 24GB RAM desktop computer with 2.27Ghz 
quad-core CPU.
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4 .4 .2  R o b u stn ess  und er C o n ten t-P reserv in g  M an ip u la tion s
The robustness of our SSH hash is evaluated by the performance metric of the normalized 
Hamming distance (NHD) as defined by Equation 4.14. It compares the differences 
between two binary hash values yi with respect to the hash length L.
1 ^
d{yi, Î/2) = 7 X  1^1 “ 2/2(^ ) I (4.14)
For similar images, the NHD is expected to be close to 0. If the original image is 
changed, the NHD between the manipulated and original image will increase accord­
ingly. The NHD between two different images will be much larger compared with the 
NHD bwetween two similar images. The hash algorithms of SVD-hash, FP-hash and 
our proposed SSH hash are tested by a number of content-preserving distortions. These 
include average filtering, median filtering, Gaussian blur, Gaussian noise, JPEG com­
pression, illumination correction, scaling, sharpening, shearing, rotation, cropping, and 
print-and-scan.
In our experiments, all distorted images are resized to 512 x 512 image size. Apart from 6  
levels of average filtering attacks, the other content-preserving distortions uniformly use 
9 levels of attacks based on the parameter settings presented in Table 4.1. In the print- 
and-scan attack, 50 images were printed by 6  HP laser printers and one Xerox solid-ink 
laser printer at 300 DPI. These 350 printed images were then scanned back into 600 DPI 
gieyscale images. Individual NHD curves of these hash algorithms under each distortion 
are shown in Figure 4.4. As shown in Figure 4.4(g), our SSH hashing algorithm exhibits 
good robustness even in the presence of large degree rotations. The NHD of our SSH is 
0.195 at the rotation angle of 40 degiees, which is much lower as compared to SVD-hash 
and FP-hash algorithms. As shown in Figure 4.4(c), the NHD of our SSH increases with 
cropping percentage while the NHD of SVD-hash outperforms our hash achieving 0.21 
when cropping at 15%. However, the NHD of SVD-hash provides a relatively poorer 
robustness to rotation attacks as shown in Figure 4.4(g).
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Figure 4.4: Performance comparisons on the robustness against content-preserving ma­
nipulations
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4 .4 .3  P erform an ce o f  R ece iv er  O p era tin g  C h aracteristic
In general, image authentication can be considered as a hypothesis testing problem [9]. 
For each original image, the hash value is computed and stored as denoted by yi. Given 
the received image, we calculate its hash value denoted as î/2 - We declare the received 
image to be authentic if the NHD between yi and y2 satisfies d{yi,y2 ) < where C is a 
decision threshold. For a given C, the number that are correctly identified as authentic 
provides an estimate of the true positive rate (TPR). The number of manipulated versions 
of other images that are falsely identified as the original image provides an estimate of 
the false positive rate (FPR). We repeat this process for decision thresholds ranged from 
0 to 1 , and derive the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. We use the ROC 
curve to quantify the overall performance of hashing algorithms between robustness and 
discrimination.
The ROC curves are presented in Figure 4.5 for all comparative algorithms. As seen in 
Figure 4.5, our proposed algorithm outperforms the other hash algorithms. The SVD- 
hash algorithm was not able to discriminate the images with average filtering, rotation, 
scaling, Gaussian noise, and shearing attacks. Although FP-hash is good at the discrim­
ination of JPEG compression, illumination correction, and shearing attacks, it cannot 
discriminate attacked images with average filtering, rotation and Gaussian noise, which 
are shown in Figure 4.5(a), Figure 4.5(g) and Figure 4.5(f) respectively. In cropping 
attack, our SSH hash was still better than the other hashing algorithms as shown in 
Figure 4.5(c).
4 .4 .4  D iscr im in a tio n  an d  Fragility
In this section, we focus on the discrimination between content distinct images and their 
sensitivities to tampering attacks. Given that the hashing bits are dependent on the 
content and secret key, using a different key will definitely increase NHD. For this reason, 
we evaluated the average NHD with a fixed key. For rotation attack, we obtained 11475 
pairs of distinct images. The average NHD of our SSH for distinct images was obtained to 
be approximately 0.3629 while the average NHD of our SSH between the original image 
and the rotated image was found to be approximately 0.1096. The average NHD of SVD-
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Figure 4.5: ROC curves of different hashing algorithms under content-preserving manip­
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hash for distinct images was approximately 0.6227 while the average NHD of SVD-hash 
between the original image and the rotated image was found to be approximately 0.6235. 
Therefore, in rotation attack, SVD-hash could not discriminate perceptually different 
images. The average NHD of FP-hash for distinct images was found to be approximately 
0.4673 while the average NHD of FP-hash between the original image and the rotated 
image was approximately 0.4530. Under rotation attack, FP-hash could not discriminate 
perceptually different images either. These results were also confirmed by the ROC curves 
as shown in Figure 4.5(g).
The fragility of the hash function to malicious tampering was also investigated. Falsi­
fication of history photos, such as the Stalin photo, which is from the gallery of Photo 
Tampering throughout History [79], as shown in Figure 4.6, highlights one kind of object 
removal attacks. The gallery was originally used as a database of digital forensics for 
identifying photo manipulation in history [80]. The NHD of our SSH-hash was found 
to be approximately 0.36, while the NHDs by SVD-hash and FP-hash were found to 
be approximately 0.19 and 0.43, respectively. Therefore, the SSH hash was particularly 
sensitive to the object removal attack.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.6: Tampering Image
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed and developed a novel image hashing scheme based 
on SIFT local descriptor. Our SSH hash was found to be robust against a wide range of
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content preserving attacks, including non-geometric attacks, geometric attacks and print- 
and-scan. Our SSH-hash outperforms other popular state-of-art hashing algorithms, such 
as FP-hash and SVD-hash. The proposed hash scheme has shown good performance 
trade-off between robustness and discrimination, quantified by ROC and NHD. The pro­
posed hash can also identify' a good relationship between original image and tampered 
image, providing discriminative capabilities to content tampering attacks.
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Chapter 5
Intrinsic Features for Printer  
Forensics
The ability to trace the origin of printed documents is desirable for large organisations, 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Such a system would assist in the tracing 
of leaked documents and illicit material. In the literature, feature-based processing and 
analysis were proposed to detect the intrinsic signature of devices. The methods of 
feature extraction are heavily relied on the assumption of device defects such as pixel 
nonuniformity noise in the imaging sensor of digital cameras, extended sensor pattern 
noise in scanners, and banding frequencies in electrophotographic (BP) printers. Such 
models are not easily applicable to the printing-and-scanning scenario.
In this chapter, an image statistical analysis based on a Multi-sized block Benford’s Law 
(MBL) is proposed for identifying intrinsic features of printed-and-scanned images for 
the application of printer identification. Based on the probability distribution of the first 
digit of DOT coefficients in a combination of { 8  x 8,16 x 16,32 x 32,64 x 64,128 x 128} 
blocks, we statistically characterize printed-and-scanned images and utilize these features 
to identify the printers. We will analyse the classification rates of the proposed MBL 
based scheme to printed-and-scanned images from a diverse printer set. The experimental 
results are demonstrated in Section 5.3.
Furthermore, a . texture analysis of the printed document based on Local Binary Pat­
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tern (LBP) descriptor is also proposed for the application of printer identification. The 
LBP provides a statistical description of the pixels’ grey level differences within their 
neighbourhoods. The occurrence histogram of local binary patterns is able to capture 
the document’s texture modifications by the distortion during the printing-and-scanning 
process, such as halftoning, geometric distortion, and mechanical defects. The most 
frequently occurring local binary patterns represent bright or dark fiat regions. Further­
more, Gou et al. proposed an approach based on the combination of three different types 
of statistical features for scanner identification [2]. In this chapter, we will also analyse 
their approach in order to evaluate the effectiveness of each type of features for printer 
identification.
5.1 Introduction
Device identification focuses on the problem of which device produced a given media. To 
identify such a device for a given media, i.e., the type, brand, model and other charac­
teristics of the device, has a significant contribution to legislation, insurance claims and 
fraud detection [81]. Forensic tools that unveil the origin and discover the authenticity 
are essential to forensic examiners. Forensic applications in law enforcement rely on a 
higher level of reliable and accurate source information. Thus, reliability, accuracy, and 
computational simplicity are highly desired. Device identification can be categorized into 
three classes: 1) Sensor pattern noise feature based schemes [25,26]; 2) Mechanical defect 
based schemes [28,29]; 3) Statistical feature based schemes [2,27].
In the literature, these three classes of features have been applied to various devices. 
The sensor pattern noise feature based schemes were initially proposed for camera iden­
tification [25,26]. Subsequently, they were applied to scanner identification [82]. Lukas 
et al. initially proposed a source camera identification scheme based on the pattern 
noise of an imaging sensor [25]. This sensor pattern noise provides the unique stochastic 
characteristic of the imaging sensor. The factors that generate the pattern noise can be 
pixel nonuniformity, optical interference, on-chip and off-chip noise [83]. Pattern noise 
can be extracted by subtracting a denoised image fr om its original version. A reference 
pattern noise that serves as an intrinsic signature is established from averaging pattern
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noise from images of the same scene, taken from the digital camera. The camera is de­
tected based on a correlation approach by matching a maximum correlation between the 
image noise pattern and the camera reference pattern. An improved method for source 
camera identification was proposed on joint estimation and detection of Photo-Response 
Non-Uniformity (PRNU) [26] for the forgery detection in digital camera images.
This sensor pattern noise has also been adapted for scanner forensics [82]. For scanner 
forensics, the sensor pattern noise of an image [25] was calculated locally, i.e., along row 
direction and along column direction. The noise patterns can be given by the average 
of the noise pattern in rows (row reference pattern), the average of the noise pattern 
in columns (column reference pattern), the correlation between the noise pattern in row 
and row reference pattern, and the correlation between the noise pattern in column 
and column reference pattern. The statistics, which include mean, standard deviation, 
skewness and kurtosis, are applied to these noise patterns to obtain their forensic features 
for scanner identification. In this chapter, we will analyse the key factors that preclude 
sensor pattern noise feature based schemes being applied to printer identification.
The mechanical defect based scheme proposed for printer identification in [28] [84-86] 
investigated printing artifacts due to BP printers mechanisms. These artifacts are due 
to variations between mechanical devices involved in the printing process, such as opti­
cal photoconductor (OPC) drum, polygon mirror, gear eccentricity and gear backlash. 
Mikkilineni et al. [28,84] and Khanna et al. [85,86] reported the banding defect as a 
consequence of space variation between raster lines. They considered that texture de­
scriptions of printed documents might capture the defect during BP printing process. A 
texture analysis based on Grey Level Co-occurrence Matrix (GLCM) together with pixel 
based measurements i.e., variance and entropy were employed as intrinsic features for 
SVM classification.
Bulan et al. also observed that the mechanical defect changed the spacing between printed 
halftone dots [29] which was originally generated by a halftoning algorithm. The cluster 
dithered halftoning algorithm is commonly employed by an BP printer by periodically 
varying the size of halftone dots to generate the illusion of different grey levels. The 
impact of the halftoning algorithm [32] is to generate a texture pattern from a dithering
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matrix or an error diffusion kernel. However, the texture pattern will be modified by 
a number of distortions during printing-and-scanning and this will be discussed later in 
this chapter.
For the third class, the statistical feature based schemes have been proposed for scanner 
identification [2,27]. In [2], three different types of statistical features were extracted on 
scanned images to perform scanner identification and forensic analysis. These features did 
not consider the source of scanning noise, but included image denoising filtering, wavelet 
analysis and neighbourhood prediction. Gou et al. [2] found that the features were able 
to capture the variations of pixel values in scanned images which could be induced by 
different types of noise. Similarly, Jiang et al. [27] proposed a forensic technique based on 
the Multi-sized block Benford’s Law (MBL) to identify the brands and models of printers 
from the printed-and-scanned images. The first digit probability distribution of multi­
sized block DOT coefficients was extracted to constitute a feature vector as the input 
of SVM classifier. MBL was found to achieve almost the same classification accuracy 
as the mean and standard deviation of the denoised image [2] as it achieved for printer 
identification. However, it was less accurate at identifying printers of similar models [30].
In this chapter, we analyse the statistical feature based scheme proposed by Gou et al. [2] 
as a generic algorithm to determine its applicability to printer identification. It is based 
on the assumption that even though the noises induced by a number of distortions in 
printing-and-scanning may corrupt the pixel values at a random amount, the statistical 
characteristics should be constant for documents printed by a single printer. The vali­
dation of the assumption is confirmed by our successful experimental results where, in 
particular, we identify different combinations of features proposed by this scheme and 
analyse the performance of these combinations via an SVM classifier. From this we can 
confirm that the statistical features proposed in [2] are generic that are not unique to be 
used for scanner identification. We investigate the combination of the statistical features 
which achieves the highest accuracy for printer identification.
We observe that the image pixel values vary among different printers and the pixels 
spread into different spatial structures. This observation complements what has been 
found in [29] and [28,84,86] that the effects of pixel size, the spacing between inter
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pixels and the spacing between raster lines contribute to the texture in the printed 
documents. The texture of a printed document established a unique pattern, which 
belongs to a specific printer. Therefore, we investigate the texture of printed documents 
based on Local Binary Pattern (LBP) descriptor for printer identification. LBP provides a 
statistical description of pixels grey level differences in a small neighbourhood provided by 
an angular space (P, P), at radius R and angle of 360°/P . Certain local binary patterns, 
which represent bright and dark flat regions, are the most frequent patterns of printed 
documents. The LBP descriptor is found to be able to capture texture modifications due 
to different distortions during printing-and-scanning. The occurrence histogram of these 
local binary patterns provides a powerful discrimination capability as an intrinsic feature 
for printer identification.
The printer identification is conducted based on identifying either images or text docu­
ments which are printed by different printers. In order to analyse these physically printed 
images or text document that may contain forensic characteristics of the printers, both 
the printed images and the printed text documents are scanned into digital format by 
one scanner. This is assuming that the interference of the scanner can be minimized. 
Therefore, we use printed-and-scanned images and printed-and-scanned text documents 
to perform an empirical investigation and forensic analysis throughout this chapter.
A novelty of our scheme is to conduct a texture analysis based on LBP descriptor for 
printer identification. The proposed printer identification scheme is successfully demon­
strated on both printed images and printed text documents. The overall workflow of our 
proposed approach is shown in Figure 5.1. Moreover, the identification is successfully 
verified between similar printers in the same model group providing the ability to per­
form fine-grained identification of printers. The identification accuracy of our LBP based 
scheme is presented and compared to the statistical features based scheme [2 ] using two 
SVM techniques: n-fold cross validation and leave one out.
Printed-and- 
scanned document
Forensic
Features
SVM
ClassificationLBP Encoder
Figure 5.1: Flowchart of Forensic Analysis for Printer Identification
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.2, related work is reviewed. 
We address the infeasibility of sensor pattern noise feature to printing-and-scanning chan­
nel for printer identification; the statistical feature based forensic analysis for scanner and 
scanned images [2] is presented in Section 5.2.2. In Section 5.3, we propose a MBL statis­
tical feature based scheme to identify the brands and models of printers. In Section 5.4, 
a texture analysis of the printed document based on LBP descriptor is proposed. In 
Section 5.5, we evaluate the effectiveness of the features in [2 ] and apply feature selection 
for its application in printer identification. The classification results are analysed and 
comprehensively compared with our proposed MBL based scheme and our proposed LBP 
descriptor based scheme. The comparison of the SVM classification between n-fold cross 
validation and leave one out is presented in Section 5.5.1, where we address the issue 
of how to construct a fair classification measure with a reliable and stable prediction 
accuracy.
5.2 Related Work
In this section, we analyse techniques for device identification summarized in the previous 
section. Sensor pattern noise [25] was proposed as an intrinsic feature for imaging sensor 
based device identification. This model has been applied in camera identification [25,26] 
and scanner identification [82]. In Section 5.2.1, we examine two key factors of this model 
which highlight the infeasibility in adapting the model to printer identification.
In Section 5.2.2, we show that the use of statistical features can be adapted for use in 
printer identification. We believe that the statistical features identified in [2] can also 
be applicable to printer identification. Hence, those features and experimental results 
will be discussed in Section 5.5.1. The results show that the use of these features can 
achieve a good accuracy for printer identification. The applicability of these features to 
printer identification extends the results of [2 ] and is one of the key contributions of this 
chapter.
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5 .2 .1  Sensor P a tte r n  N o ise  F eature
The sensor pattern noise is considered to be an intrinsic characteristic generated by 
imaging sensors. This pattern noise is independent of image content. A reference sensor 
pattern noise A^e/ [25] of individual camera set is defined and calculated by averaging 
the sum of noise residuals of multiple images taken by the same camera as expressed 
in Equation (5.1). The noise residual n { i ,j) ,{ i , j )  G [m,n] is obtained as being the 
subtraction between an image I { i , j ) i{ i , j )  E [m,n] and the denoised version f { I { i , j) )  
as defined in Equation (5.2). Two factors that are crucial to construct an accurate 
identification system, are the denoising filter and the averaging solution to remove the 
random noise, as follows:
• Denoising filter The denoising filter /  is based on a spatially adaptive statistical 
model where image wavelet coefficients are modeled to be independent Gaussian 
random variables with zero-mean and variance [87]. Assuming the image signal is 
transmitted over an Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel, the ratio 
between the noise free image signal and noisy output is the filter transfer function.
The variance of input image signal is estimated by the data points in square windows
of the local neighbourhood. The noisy imaging sensor output consists of the noise 
pattern of the camera that captures the image, and the image content effects. 
Designing and applying an appropriate denoising filter for the underlying channel 
of camera imaging sensor is crucial to removing the image content effects, which 
are dominant in the noisy output. In [25], Lukas et al. chose this denoising filter as 
it outperformed other filters, such as Wiener filter or median filter. As for printer 
identification, the image is present as a printed-and-scanned digital image. The 
assumption made previously is not valid, because the print-and-scan channel does 
not simply follow an AWGN model.
k = l , . . , N
^ - /  =  lv  Z  (5-1)
i < M , j < N
=  /<*■>(*,j )  -  (5.2)
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• Averaging solution Applying the averaging solution to denoised images aims to 
remove the random noise components from the fixed pattern noise [25]. This oper­
ation requires pixel-wise alignment. In the camera, the colour filter array (CFA) is 
used to measure primary colours, i.e., red, green and blue. For the CFA generated 
camera pattern noise, it performs auto-alignment of image-to-image every time it 
is captured by a camera. However, the printer does not have a CFA, and Equa­
tion (5.1) will not be satisfied. As images I^ { i,j)  are printed every time by the 
same printer, the averaging of the sum of noise residuals n ^ ^ \i , j)  of the k-th  image, 
where fee [1, A], will require it to be the pixel-wise, i.e., (i, j ) ,  where {i,j)  G [m,n], 
aligned correspondingly.
The sensor noise pattern feature based scheme in [25] assumes an AWCN channel. 
Peticolas et al. in [8 8 ] described a resampling process that introduced errors during 
a high resolution printing-and-scanning process. These errors are found to be non- 
uniform geometric distortion and they do not fit an AWCN channel. Therefore, 
since the research in this chapter is concerned with printer identification, it is not 
appropriate to use a sensor noise pattern feature scheme as a basis for printer 
identification.
5 .2 .2  S ta tis tic a l F eatures
In [2], three different types of statistical features were proposed to capture the charac­
teristics of scanner noise, without distinction between fixed pattern noise and random 
noise. These features included the mean and standard deviation of the noise obtained 
by a set of denoising filters, the goodness of Caussian fitting to the actual wavelet coef­
ficients distribution in high frequency bands, and pixel value neighbourhood prediction 
in scanned image smooth regions.
1. Denoising filtering The idea of using a denoising filter is explained in Equation 5.2 
in Section 5.2.1. W ithout knowing the explicit channel model. Con et al. [2 ] pro­
posed using the denoising filters comprising linear filtering, median filtering and 
Wiener filtering, as shown in Table 5.1. The logarithm function, i.e., log2  is ap­
plied to the mean and the standard deviation of the noise which is captured by
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Equation (5.2). As for printing-and-scanning, we apply the filters as indicated in 
Table 5.1 to printed-and-scanned images. The SVM performance will be discussed 
in Section 5.5.
Table 5.1: Statistics based on the denoising filters
Denoising Filter Statistics
Linear averaging filter 
Linear Gaussian filter 
Median filtering 
Wiener 3 x 3  
Wiener 5 x 5
log2  (Mean) 
log2  {Standard deviation)
2. Wavelet analysis When applying one-step Digital Wavelet Transform (DWT), an 
image is converted into four subbands: LL subband, LH subband, HL subband 
and HH subband. It is noted that the HH, LH and HL subbands of DWT do 
not obey the Gaussian distribution [89] [90] [91]. Gou et al. observed that the 
scanned digital photograph in the high frequency subbands of the DWT domain 
followed a Gaussian distribution as a consequence of scanning noise introduced by 
scanner [2]. As such, in our experiments, we will apply the Gaussian fitting to the 
high frequency subbands of DWT coefficients to the printed-and-scanned images. 
The goodness of Gaussian fitting varies as it depends on the brands and models of 
the printers.
3. Neighbourhood prediction error Based on the assumption made by Gou et al. [2], an 
image’s pixel values in a smooth region can be consistently predicted from its eight 
neighbouring pixels with high precision. The noise may corrupt an image pixel 
value leading to some neighbourhood prediction errors. The mean and standard 
deviation of the predicted error was used as their last categorized features.
Gou et al. noted that these statistical features remained constant for a particular 
scanner. In this chapter we assume that a similar observation can be made of print­
ers. Thus, for any given printer, the statistical features representing the printer will 
be the same. Therefore, we apply the approach of Gou et al. for printer identifica-
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tion. The results in Section 5.5.1 show successful printer classification confirming 
our assumption regarding the uniqueness of statistical features for a given printer is 
a valid one. We evaluate the effectiveness of the three types of statistical features on 
the classification accuracy for printer identification. In particular, in Section 5.5.1 
we present classification accuracy results of different combinations of three types 
of features. Moreover, a comparison of its performance with our proposed MBL 
scheme and our proposed LBP scheme is given in Section 5.5. In the next section, 
we present our proposed MBL scheme, which is a statistical feature based approach 
using the Benford’s Law.
5.3 MBL and Its Application to  Printer Identification
5 .3 .1  B en fo rd ’s Law
Benford’s law is an empirical law for the probability distribution of the first digit d (d G 
1,...,9), which follows a logarithmic scale, as shown in Equation 5.3
p{d) = logio{l +  - ) ,d  =  1,2,..., 9 (5.3)
In [92], the distribution of the most significant digits of Discrete Cosine Transform (DOT) 
coefficients was found to follow the Benford’s law closely. To validate greyscale DOT 
coefficients that conform to Benford’s law, an original image is first converted into a 
greyscale image, and then 8 x 8  block DOT is applied, but discarding the DC components. 
The frequencies of the first digit of block-DCT coefficients of each image are calculated to 
obtain a probability distribution. By averaging the first digit distribution of 1338 images, 
downloaded from the Uncompressed Image Database (UCID) [93], it is found that the 
distribution of the first digit of the block-DCT coefficients follows Benford’s law [92], as 
shown in Figure 5.2. In this figure, the red bar indicates Benford’s law, while the blue 
bar shows first digit distribution. In [94], Perez-Gonzalez et al. interpreted Benford’s law 
in a Fourier approximation to an empirical digit distribution for the application in image 
steganography to determine whether the message was hidden inside a natural image. 
Perez-Gonzalez et al. [94] mentioned that Benford’s law has the following properties:
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Figure 5.2: The first digit distribution of block-DCT coefficients for UCID dataset
[Property 2] Suppose that a random variable X  follows Benford’s law; then 
the random variable Z = a X  will follow Benford’s law for an arbitrary o if 
and only if X  is strong Benford.
[Property 3[ Let X  follows Benford’s law, and Let Y  be another random vari­
able independent of X. Then, the random variable Z  =  X V  is strong Benford.
Li et al. also developed a generalized Benford’s law to detect double JPEG compres­
sion [95]. Their research showed that the Benford’s law was independent to the image 
content, and robust as forensic features.
5 .3 .2  M B L  S ta tis tic s
To test the validity of the Benford’s law for printer identification, we assume the impact 
of the printer’s halftoning and geometric distortion on the test images will be either 
additive or multiplicative noise. This noise will change the local spatial pixel positions 
or grey levels and will also change the DCT coefficients. However, the change of the first 
digit probability distribution of a single block of DCT coefficients cannot represent the 
overall decorrelation of noise features in test images made by printers. Thus, the first 
digit statistics of DCT coefficients with various block sizes is possible to detect the weak 
noise energy associated with the different parts of the image. This is represented by the 
change in the block DCT coefficients. If X is 8 x8  block-DCT coefficients, multi-size block 
DCT can choose 2°^  times the size of X. Let a = 0,1, 2,3,4 as a multiplicative factor.
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The process of extracting the statistics of multi-size block DCT coefficients is presented 
in Figure 5.3. A test image is printed by one of the experimental printers at a resolution 
of 600x600 dpi. And the printout is then digitally scanned at a resolution of 600x600 
dpi by the Infotec ISC 3535 digital scanner. Multi-size blocks are applied to the scanned 
printout, where SVM features are extracted from the first digit probability distribution of 
multi-size block DCT coefficients. For an Image g{i,j)  V%, j  6  0 ,1,..., n — 1, and its n x n
Multi-size Block Benford's Law
Printed-and-
scanned
Image
Benford’s Law 
Statistics
Benford’s Law 
Statistics
Benford’s Law 
Statistics
Original Image SVM
16x16 block 
2D DCT
2D DCT
x8  block
2" X 2" block 
2D  DCT
Figure 5.3: Multi-size Block DCT Coefficients Statistics Flowchart
block 2D DCT transform G(u,v) Vu,n G 0,1, ...,n  — 1, are expressed in Equation 5.4 to 
Equation 5.6
n —1 n —1
i—0 j=0
with
i  for % =  0 ,
and
a(j)
^  for j  = 0 , 
1 for j  > 0
(5.5)
(5.6)
In our initial experiment, we printed five copies of a test image on a Xerox laser printer, 
and scanned in gieyscale image as shown in Figure 5.4(a). To reduce the random noise
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I
First Digit
(a) A test image printed on Xerox Phaser (b) M ulti-size block DCT coefficients distribution  
4800, and scanned in greyscale image vs original Benford’s law
Figure 5.4: A test image and its multi-size block DCT coefRcients statistics
impact, the white margin is removed from each scanned image because the scanned 
image size is larger than that of the test image. Each processed image is individually 
calculated based on the hrst digit distribution on DCT coefficients with different block 
sizes 8x8,16 X16,32 x 32,64 x 64, and 128 x 128. By averaging the Benford’s law statistics 
over five copies of the test image to reduce randomness, we found that the results closely 
followed the Benford’s Law distribution, as shown in Figure 5.4(b). Therefore, empirical 
distribution of the multi-size block DCT coefhcients can be generalized to Benford’s law 
as indicated in [94] ^.
5 .3 .3  E xp er im en ts  and p erform ance an a lysis  
M ulti-size block D C T coefficients s ta tis tic s
For our experiments, we use five high resolution images downloaded from plioto.net as 
illustrated in Figure 5.5. These images are printed using six model printers as shown
^Remark: M ulti-size block D C T coefficients can be regarded as an intrinsic signature. Since the  
influence of halftoning and printing distortion is reflected in the spatial pixels of the test image. This 
influence will change block-DCT coefficients distribution. However, from a channel model point o f view, 
this influence is a com posite noise of halftoning and the printing. The magnified impact of this noise 
signal is obtained by sampling the test image based on m ulti-size block DC T coefhcients.
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in Table 5.2. Five copies of each test image are printed for each printer. The printed 
images are then scanned into A4 size images with 600 dpi greyscale JPEG format.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 5.5: Test Images
(e )
Table 5.2: Utilized Printers in Experiment
Brand Model Parameters DPI
HP deskjet 5940 600
Cannon DeskJet MPS60 300
HP LaserJet 4250 600
Lexmark Laser X646e 600
Xerox Phaser 5800 600
Xerox Phaser 4800 600
We use a bounding box to remove the white margin of the scanned images so that 
each scanned image can be resized to the same size image of 1024x1024 pixels by cubic 
interpolation. The resized images are then transformed into DCT domains with multi-size 
blocks followed by applying first digit probability statistics to each block DCT coefficients. 
We assign a label to each printer and calculate first digit distribution as 9 forensic feature 
vectors for SVM input. In Table 5.3, the classification accuracy of MBL based on different 
sizes of block is presented. The MBL based on a combination of block sizes { 8  x 8,16 x 
16,32 X  32,64 x 64,128 x 128} achieves the highest accuracy as compared to the MBL 
based on every single block size.
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Table 5.3: Multi-size Block DCT vs Detection Accuracy
Block Size Detection Accuracy
8 x8 40.0%
16x16 43.33%
32x32 56.67%
64x64 51.61%
128x128 56.67%
{8x8,16x16,32x32,64x64,128x128} 94.0%
SVM  classifier
In our experiments, LIBSVM [96] is used for implementing the miilti-SVM classifier, 
which provides a parameter selection tool using RBF kernel with cross validation via a 
parallel grid search. RBF kernel is selected because of its nonlinearity, and less com­
putational complexity with only two hyperparameters C  and 7  needed to be tuned to 
find the best classification performance. A u-fold cross-validation is used to divide the 
training set into v subsets of equal size. One subset is predicted by using the classifier 
trained on the remaining u — 1 subset. A five-fold cross validation was used to estimate 
the accuracy of each parameter combination.
In order to find the best values of C  and 7 , a search of C G [^ o<7io(—5)..?of7io(15)] and 
7  G [logio{3)..logio{—15)] is selected to train the first digit probability as features. The 
maximum accuracy of SVM is recorded. For (7 =  32 and 7  =  0.5, the maximum clas­
sification accuracy for five brand printers can be achieved approximately up to 96% as 
shown in Figure 5.6.
For the brand identification experiments, the average classification accuracy achieved is 
approximately 96.0% for the printers tested. The printers include HP Laserjet 4250, 
Xerox Phaser 5800, Cannon MSP60, Lexmark X646e and HP deskjet 5940. It is assumed 
that the laser and ink jet printers are considered to be different. We then apply the present 
scheme to classify the distinct six printer models from these five printer brands. Table 5.4 
shows the model classification confusion matrix for six different laser and ink jet printer 
models. The average classification accuracy rate achieved is approximately 94.0% which 
indicates that our scheme can be used to successfully identify different printer models. 
In order to verify the effectiveness of the proposed MBL based scheme, we conduct the
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Best log2(C) = 5 log2(gamma) =-1 accuracy = 96.0% 
C = 32 gamma = 0.5
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Figure 5.6: Five Brands of Printers in SVM model
experiments over 350 printed-and-scanned images across a group of similar printers, two 
of which are identical models, as shown in Table 5.6 in Section 5.5. The performance is 
evaluated by cross validation and leave one out as presented in Section 5.5.
Table 5.4: Six Distinct Printer Model Classification Confusion Matrix
Predict
Brand
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HP Laserjet 4250 92.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Xerox Phaser 5800 98.0% 2 .0 %
Train Cannon MSP60 1 0 0 %
Lexmark X646e 8 .0 % 92.0%
HP Deskjet 5940 1 0 0 %
Xerox Phaser 4800 16.0% 84.0%
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5.4 Local Binary Pattern for Printer Identification
Apart from our proposed MBL statistical feature based scheme, we also investigate printer 
characteristics by texture analysis of printed-and-scanned documents. Resolution can be 
identified by the width and height of the image together with the total number of pixels 
in an image. According to the Nyquist sampling theorem [97], scanning a signal at the 
resolution that are two times of the resolution used for printing, it can capture the details 
of pixel modifications caused by the printer defects. However, these modifications may be 
present locally. Therefore, local texture analysis would be ideal to analyse the distorted 
documents during printing-and-scanning.
Texture analysis has been commonly applied to image classification and segmentation [98]. 
The first order texture measures include mean and variance. The second order texture 
measures, such as GLCM [99] consider the relationship between groups of two pixels. 
Texture analysis techniques based on GLCM [28,84,86] were proposed to analyse grey 
level occurrences in a vertical direction covering pixels between one to ten rows distance 
of text document for EP printer identification. Even though the direction can be ex­
tended into horizontal and diagonal directions, the description capability of grey levels of 
the number of pixels involved is much lower compared with the LBP descriptor, at which 
the joint grey level differences distribution of pixels in a local neighbourhood is defined 
in an angular space (P, R). The angular space is P consists of equally spaced pixels on a 
circle of radius R, which forms a circularly symmetric neighbourhood.
5 .4 .1  L B P  O verv iew
The texture T in a local neighbour of a grey-scale image is defined [100] as the joint 
distribution of grey levels of P image pixels as expressed in Equation (5.7), where Qc is 
the grey scale value of the central pixel of the P ( from 0 to P  — 1 ) neighbourhoods. P 
pixels are equally distributed on a circle of radius R which forms a circularly symmetric 
neighbour set, defined as LEP p r^ . Assume that Qc is located at (0,0), Qp,p G [0,P — 1] 
will be placed at {Pcos(27rp/P), Psin(27rp/P)}. As an example, for (P, P) =  (8,1), the
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circular distribution of P pixels is shown in Figure 5.7.
T =  t{gc,go,..^,9p-i) (5.7)
g?
•g2
.g l
•g4 .g c •gO
g5 .g 6 'g 7
Figure 5.7: Circularly symmetric neighbour pixels for P = 8 , R=1
• Properties of greyscale Invariance 
By subtracting the grey value of the center pixel gc from the grey values of the cir­
cularly symmetric neighbourhood gp ( p=0,..,P-l), the local image texture becomes 
t{9c,9o -  9c, 91 -  9c, ‘• ; 9 P - i  -  Pc). Assuming gc is independent of gp  -  gc, T  can 
be approximated as
T^t{gc)t{go  — Pcjpi — 9c, .,P P -i — 9c) (5.8)
In Equation (5.8), t{gc) describes the overall luminance of the image, unrelated to 
the local image texture. Therefore, the texture information in a local neighbour­
hood is interpreted as a joint difference distribution as given in Equation (5.9),
T ^ t{g o  — 9c, 9i — 9c, •••? 9 P - i  ~  9c) (5.9)
Since taking the signed function S{x) over the differences Pp—Pc,where p £ [0, P —1], 
5(pp — pc) would remain constant regardless of any changes of the main luminance. 
The invariance is achieved by scaling the grey scale where the signed differences 
substitute the differences of real pixel values. Therefore, the joint difference distri­
bution is invariant towards any shifts in grey scale, as expressed in Equation (5.10).
r « t ( s ( p o  -  Pc), s(p i -  Pc), - ,  s { g p - i  -  Pc)) (5.10)
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where
Finally, the joint difference distribution of P pixels becomes binary values by mul­
tiplying a factor of 2^, as expressed in Equation (5.12).
P - i
LBPp,R ^ Y . s { g p -  gcW . (5.12)
p = 0
Equation (5.12) defines the local binary pattern derived from the image texture 
characteristics, by thresholding the pixels of a local neighbourhood at its central 
pixel value. The pixel, which is not located at the centre of the pixels, is calculated 
by an interpolation algorithm as defined in [100]. The signed differences guarantee 
LBP invariance against any monotonie transformation of the grey scale.
5 .4 .2  D esig n  o f  U n iform  S am p lin g  in  L B P  for P r in ter  Id en tifica tio n  
A n exam ple o f printer distortions
The technologies used in printers vary among manufacturers, and on the specific appli­
cation. Laser printers usually adapt a dithering halftoning algorithm due to its com­
putational efficiency and its wide use for document processing [32]. In contrast, inkject 
printers adapt an error diffusion halftoning algorithm which is based on a neighbourhood 
operation [33]. It is found to achieve a better quality as compared with dithering. Hence 
its application is commonly found in image processing. Phaser printers use Xerox Solid 
Ink technology. The print quality is considered to be excellent with early applications in 
the graphic design industry. Phaser printers are now mostly found in industrial markets.
A printed image carries information about the origin of the printer. Besides the content 
it conveys, the information may include printing technologies, geometric distortion, print 
quality defects, toner usage and paper types. All of these factors will result in the texture 
formed in the printed document.
During the printing-and-scanning process, a number of distortions may cause the degra­
dation of an image from its original profile, in the form of grey level shifts and spatial 
location displacement. In order to determine the differences of a digital image before
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and after printing-and-scanning, an image of size 4000 x 4000 pixels with grey scale value 
of 128, was printed in 300 dpi by printers HP4250, HP4500 and Xerox8500. This was 
followed by Infotec ISC 3535 scanning at 600dpi in JPEG format.
To illustrate, three printed-and-scanned images of size 256 x 256 pixels are presented 
in Figures 5.8(a) 5.8(b) and 5.8(c). Starting at the top left of each image at pixel 
coordinates (10,11), the pixel values of each 8 x8  image block of the corresponding Fig­
ures 5.8(a), 5.8(b) and 5.8(c), are displayed in Figures 5.8(d), 5.8(e) and 5.8(f), re­
spectively. As observed, the pixel values in each block of the images printed by three 
distinct printers are significantly different. The original grey scale values of the pixels 
have changed fiom 128 and varied randomly between 0 to 255. For the image printed 
by the Xerox Phaser 8500 printer shown in Figure 5.8(c), the visual dot structure is 
relatively different as compared with the other two images shown in Figure 5.8(a) and 
Figure 5.8(b), which are printed by HP laser printers. This may be due to the solid ink 
technology used by the Phaser printer, which is different from the laser or inkjet printer. 
In solid ink technology, ink or toner powder is softened, melted from a heated drum 
before it is transferred to the paper. The composition of the ink is uniquely made from 
food-grade processed vegetable oils, which is covered by a wax with a glossy surface [1 0 1 ].
The printed patterns in Figure 5.8(a) and Figure 5.8(b) share some similarities as they 
appear as a structure printed in dithered dots. However, the size of the printed dots, 
the spacing between the dots and the spacing between the raster lines appear differently 
as the dots are more condensed in the image shown in Figure 5.8(b) than the image 
shown in Figure 5.8(a). This is due to the fact that before printing, image pixels are first 
converted into halftone patterns according to a fixed spatial structure determined by a 
specific halftoning algorithm embedded in the types of printers. For a laser printer, an 
ordered dither algorithm generates a binary halftone image by comparing pixels with a 
threshold value determined from a dithering matrix. The visual pattern would depend 
upon the size of the dithering matrix, the values of dithering matrix and also the spatial 
structure. If this spatial structure appears dispersed or clustered, it is known as dispersed 
dithering or cluster dithering [32].
Another interesting observation in the images shown in Figure 5.8(a) and Figure 5.8(b)
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(a) Printed-and-scanned M idtone (b) Printed-and-scanned M idtone 
greyscale Patch Displayed at Size greyscale Patch Displayed at Size 
256x256 by HP LaserJet4250 256x256 by HP LaserJet4500
(c) Printed-and-scanned M idtone  
greyscale Patch Displayed at Size 
256x256 bv Xerox Phaser8500
156 231 228 151 80 86 127 205
142 232 232 159 94 69 126 213
192 231 216 184 171 152 184 217
223 187 154 167 204 222 209 171
194 113 86 141 212 234 180 105
163 72 66 153 241 236 161 79
176 144 150 188 222 193 194 165
172 196 203 189 171 142 171 194
176 145 127 121 148 186 198 172
202 141 94 66 105 178 208 167
165 172 124 86 103 159 195 182
96 155 185 155 113 110 106 131
72 105 162 181 139 84 61 106
139 126 145 178 178 142 136 162
194 143 76 74 131 181 222 198
196 151 71 59 115 173 220 195
150 134 123 124 138 155 156 143
147 127 144 138 143 155 151 136
149 139 133 140 153 162 154 144
151 147 140 138 144 149 144 137
153 155 152 143 140 144 143 138
151 155 161 149 144 151 153 145
144 143 154 145 146 156 157 147
143 138 141 136 140 149 148 138
(d) Printed-and-scanned M idtone (e) Printed-and-scanned M idtone (f) Printed-and-scanned M idtone
greyscale Values at Size 8x8 by HP greyscale Values at Size 8x8 by HP greyscale Values at Size 8x8 by Xerox
LaserJet4250 LaserJet4500 Phaser8500
«“.= ‘S s
(g) Probability Distribution of LBPs (h) Probability Distribution of LBPs
at (P ,R )= (8,1) o f Printed-and-scanned at (P ,R )= (8 ,1) o f Printed-and-scanned
M idtone greyscale Patch by HP Laser- M idtone greyscale Patch by HP Laser-
(i) Probability Distribution of LBPs 
at (P ,R )= (8 ,1) of Printed-and-scanned  
M idtone greyscale Patch by HP Lcxser- 
Jet4250 and HP LaserJet4500 versus 59 Jet4500 and Xerox Phaser8500 versus ,let4250 and HP LaserJet4500 and Xe- 
Bins 59 Bins rox Plniser8500 versus 59 Bins
Figure 5.8; Demonstration of Printed-and-Scanned Midtone Patches and Corresponding 
LBP Descriptions at (P,R)=(8,1)
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is that the spacing between raster lines varied at some random locations, which appears 
like “scratches” in white lines. In [29], non-uniform spacing between raster lines was 
explained as the geometric distortion caused by the variations in laser scanning speed 
over a scan line, and variations in the velocity of the OPC drum. It is due to these 
differences between halftone dot positions before and after printing that form the basis 
of the approach [29] to printer identification. In [28] these variations were referred to as 
banding defects, and contributed to the texture of a printed document. A GLCM matrix 
was proposed to measure the texture.
In [28], the GLCM was used to calculate the probability of grey level (greyscale intensity) 
value n and grey level value m  occurred between two spatially placed pixels where one 
pixel was located vertically from one row to ten rows distance to another pixel. Besides 
some GLCM statistics, together with variance and entropy of the pixel values in the 
printed area of character, a 2 2  dimensional feature set was used for texture analysis in 
printed text documents.
In comparison to GLCM, LBP provides a grey level spatial distribution in multidimen­
sion. It counts the grey levels in a circularly symmetric neighbourhood which is deter­
mined by an angular space (P, jR), with P equally distributed pixels around a circle of 
radius R. It considers the signed differences of grey levels rather than the grey levels 
of pixels in a local neighbourhood. The LBP descriptor is also invariant against any 
monotonie transformation of the greyscale. Therefore, the LBP based descriptor is ide­
ally suited for printing-and-scanning application, where the pixel values of an image will 
change and vary arbitrarily. The printed-and-scanned image will degiade due to a num­
ber of causes, such as local geometric distortion, noise and mechanical defect. However, 
the device fi'om which the image is generated, i.e., the printer, will leave a unique mark 
or signature that could be detected more accurately by a multidimensional texture anal­
ysis, such as LBP, as compared to GLCM based analysis. The construction of LBPs and 
parameter selection will be presented in the following section.
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Uniform  Sam pling and Param eter Selections
As expressed in Equation (5.12), 2^ binary patterns will be generated in a P pixel 
neighbourhood. Ojala et al. observed that the pattern in the P pixel neighbourhood has 
a uniformity value U [100]. This value was calculated based on the number of spatial 
transitions from “0” and “1 ” and vice versa. Ojala et al. referred to the pattern that 
had a value of at most 2, i.e., U <  2, as a uniform pattern. Therefore, instead of 
Equation (5.12), they proposed an LBP descriptor for texture classification as expressed 
in Equation (5.13).
T pdescriptor _  f  Sp=Q ^(ffp ~  U{LBP(j3 ji'^ ) < 2, .
- \ p  + i  others.
where
U{LBP(^Pji'^) — \s {g p - i  — Qc) — s{go — p c ) |
P - i
+ X / ~  c^) — s{gp-i — gc)\
p = i
(5.14)
In this chapter, we propose to use the LBP descriptor for printer identification by clas­
sifying the texture of the printed document. An LBP encoding process is applied to 
every pixel of a printed document. Therefore, every greyscale pixel of a document is 
converted into a binary codeword. This is illustrated by a single block image with eight 
neighbourhood pixels, i.e., {P,R) = (8,1), as shown in Figure 5.9. An LBP codebook
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Figure 5.9: an Illustration of LBP Encoder at (P, R) = (8 ,1) Converting an Image Block 
of 3 X 3 Pixels into a Binary Codeword
is constructed based on LBP descriptor as expressed in Equation (5.13). As shown in 
Table 5.5, an LBP codebook is demonstrated with (P, R) — (8 ,1) which consists of 58 
uniform unique patterns plus one single pattern. In total, a 59-dimensional histogram is 
constructed as an intrinsic feature of a printed document.
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Table 5.5: LBP Codebook
Patterns U Value Bin Index Patterns U Value Bin Index
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 31
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 32
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 33
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 4 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 34
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 35
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 36
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 37
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 38
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 9 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 39
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 40
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 41
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 42
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 13 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 43
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 14 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 44
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 15 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 45
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 16 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 46
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 17 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 47
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 18 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 48
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 19 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 49
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 2 50
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 51
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 52
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 23 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 53
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 24 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 54
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 25 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 55
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 26 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 56
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 27 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 57
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 28 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 58
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 29 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 4
59
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 30 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 6
The patterns of a printed document have U values which vary from 0, 2, 4 and 6 . For 
example, the patterns “0000 0000” and “1111 1111” have U value of 0; the pattern “0000 
0010” has U value of 2 ; the pattern “0000 1010” has U value of 4 and the pattern “0010 
1010” has U value of 6 . The patterns of which U < 2  are sequentially encoded from 1 to 
58. These 58 patterns are uniform patterns representing the smooth region in printed- 
and-scanned document. The remaining patterns with U = A and U = 6 are regarded 
as one single pattern. In Table 5.5, the pattern “0000 1010” is enumerated as one of 
the patterns of which U value is equal to 4. The pattern “0010 1010” is enumerated
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as one of the patterns of which U value is equal to 6 . The feature employed in texture 
analysis is a histogram of these 59 patterns. There are 59 bins in the histogram. Each 
of the 58 uniform patterns falls into an individual bin. All 58 uniform patterns are 
sequentially assigned from bin 1 to bin 58. The 59th bin of the histogram allocates 
the rest of patterns with U = 4 and U = 6. Hence, the LBP codebook is constructed 
with 58 individual uniform local binary patterns and a single local binary pattern which 
is counted by a number of local binary patterns with the uniformity value U > 2 as 
presented in Table 5.5.
The selection of (P, R) determines the number of pixels and their spatial structure en­
closed in a small neighbourhood. As the value of (P, R) becomes large, the number of 
the corresponding LBPs increases, and so does the value of uniformity U. As an example, 
for (P, R) = (10,1), the uniformity value U varies from 0, 2, 4, 6 , 8 , to 10. The uniform 
patterns {U < 2) of LBPs are chosen and counted from 1 to 92. The remaining LBPs 
are treated as one single pattern, with the bin index 93. In Section 5.4.3, we find a 
selection of (P, R) at which P varies from 8  to 16 and R varies from 1 to 2, and slightly 
vary the discrimination capability of LBP descriptor. Therefore, we choose a selection 
of (P, R) = (8,1) throughout the chapter because of its computational simplicity. This 
is validated by our hypothesis study in Section 5.4.3, where the LBP descriptors are 
determined on 350 printed images and 350 printed text documents.
For the printing-and-scanning process, we argue that the uniform pattern which rep­
resents the smooth region would capture the texture information. The smooth region, 
where the grey level differences in a local neighbourhood are small, and according to 
the LBP descriptor, is defined as a local binary pattern in which the number of spatial 
transitions is small, i.e., the pattern with U < 2. This pattern dominates the texture 
of a printed document which is confirmed by our hypothesis study as discussed in Sec­
tion 5.4.3. The non-smooth region, where the grey level differences in a local neighbour­
hood are large, and according to the LBP descriptor, is defined as a local binary pattern 
in which the number of spatial transitions is large, i.e., the pattern with U > 2. This 
pattern is more likely to change into a different pattern caused by distortions during a 
printing-and-scanning process. Therefore, a histogram of the LBP descriptor provides an 
excellent discrimination capability for printer identification as presented in Section 5.5.
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5 .4 .3  H y p o th e s is  S tu d y
Considering the pixels in a 3x3 neighbourhood, i.e.,(P, R) = (8 ,1), the uniform patterns 
are allocated from the 1st bin to the 58th bin with the rest of the patterns fall in the 59th 
bin. Therefore, for 256 grey levels ranging from 0 to 255, are scaled into 59 grey levels 
ranging from 0 to 58. The histogram of 59 binary patterns, with the bin index from 1 
to 59, constitutes an intrinsic feature to identify the texture patterns in a printed-and- 
scanned document.
The LBP descriptor at {P,R) = (8,1) of printed-and-scanned midtone patches in Fig­
ures 5.8(a), 5.8(b) and 5.8(c) are presented in Figures 5.8(g), 5.8(h) and 5.8(i), respec­
tively. The x-axis indicates the 59 bins constructed from 59 patterns of LBP descriptor 
at {P,R) = (8 , 1 ). The y-axis is the normalized histogram which counts the number of 
patterns that fall into each bin. As shown in Figure 5.8(g), from bin 1 to bin 59, there is 
only one case where the values generated by printers of HP Laser Jet4250 and HP Laser- 
Jet4500 at y-axis that are identical, i.e., 0.0113 at B in  = 50. In Figure 5.8(h), from bin 1 
to bin 59, there are no cases where the values generated by printers of HP LaserJet4500 
and Xerox Phaser8500 at y-axis are identical. In Figure 5.8(i), there are no cases where 
the values generated by the three printers are identical. Therefore, the LBP descriptor 
provides good discrimination capability for identifying the textures of images printed by 
three different printers. This is further verified by testing 350 images on seven printers, 
i.e., 50 images on each printer, as discussed below.
The occurrence probability of the 58 uniform patterns of total patterns is illustrated in 
Figure 5.10. The results are based on 350 images randomly selected from UCID [93], 
and printed by seven printers as shown in Table 5.6. The selected uniform patterns with 
U < 2, contribute at an average rate of 88.54% of 59 total patterns for seven printers. 
For each printer, the percentage accuracy rates of a uniform pattern for 50 images are as 
follows: 87.66% ±0.0098 for HP 4200, 89.13% ±0.013 for HP4100(1), 88.74% ±0.0205 for 
HP4250, 88.56% ±  0.018 for HP4100(2), 89.15% ±  0.0232 for HP4015, 87.91% ±  0.0236 
for HP4500 and 88.65% ±  0.0107 for Xerox8500. These results are shown in Figure 5.11.
For each printer, the occurrence histogram of 59 LBPs is presented with the bin index
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Figure 5.10; Occurrence Histogram of Uniform LBPs at {P, R) =  (8 ,1) for Seven Printers
given at the x-axis, which indicates the most frequently appeared uniform patterns out of 
58 uniform LBPs. The occurrence histograms of each printer are shown in Figure 5.10(a) 
to Figure 5.10(g). For seven printers, the most frequently appeared uniform pattern is 
“0000 0000” with an average occurrence rate at 4.45% and “1111 1111” with an average
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Table 5.6; Fine Printers in Experiment
Brand Model Parameters DPI
HP LaserJet 4200N 300
HP LaserJet 4100 300
HP LaserJet 4250 300
HP LaserJet 4100 300
HP LaserJet 4015 300
HP LaserJet 4500 300
Xerox Phaser 8500 300
o  0.92
0.9
% 0.84
0.82
H P4200NHP4100(1) HP4250
Printer^Model's
HP4015 HP4500 Xerox8500
Figure 5.11: Probability Distribution of Uniform Patterns
occurrence rate at 8.32% of total 58 uniform LBPs.
Furthermore, as discussed in Section 5.4, the selection of (P, R) will cover a different 
number of neighbourhood pixels located in a space determined by radius R and angle 
360°/P. Therefore, the LBP will result in different local texture binary patterns. In Fig­
ure 5.12(a), we obtained the SVM classification rate based on image datasets at angular 
space of (P, P), where R=1 with P =  8,10,12,14,16, and where R=2 with P=8,10,12,14,16. 
As the values of P and R increase, the computation complexity rises accordingly. This is 
also true for purely text documents which are downloaded from the copyright-free ebook 
Gutenberg project [1 0 2 ] as shown in Figure 5.12(b).
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Figure 5.12; SVM Performance of LBP Descriptor based on (P,R) Selection
5.5 Performance Evaluation and Comparisons
In this section, we focus on the performance of the proposed MBL based scheme in Sec­
tion 5.3, and the proposed LBP descriptor at (P, P) =  (8 ,1) in Section 5.4. We perform 
a comparison study of the statistical features based forensic analysis [2]. For the compar­
ison study, a set of features will be selected for identifying printed-and-scanned images 
based on the criteria that the combination of selected features achieved a maximum SVM 
classification rate. Furthermore, the robustness of the proposed scheme will also be tested 
against common post-processing in Section 5.5.4. Finally in Section 5.5.5, we present the 
computation complexity analysis with a comparison between our LBP descriptor and the 
selected statistical features based scheme.
5.5 .1  T h e  C h oice o f  C lassifier
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is commonly used as a classifier which maps an unlabeled 
instance to a label by learning a selected kernel function. It constructs a hyperplane 
which achieves a good separation by finding the largest distance to the labeled instances 
of any classes. We consider an n-fold cross validation and leave one out for learning the 
parameters of the selected kernel function on a training set so as to predict the labels
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on a test set [103]. The accuracy of a classifier is the probability of correctly classifying 
a randomly selected instance out of the overall number of instances in the dataset. The 
accuracy of the classifier is ideally to be an estimation with low bias and low variance,
i.e., the classification accuracy is stable with confidence. The leave one out is almost 
unbiased especially in the case where the number of samples is small, but at an extra 
computational cost [104]. In the following section, the estimation of the classifier accuracy 
will be performed both for Five-fold cross validation and leave one out
Five-Fold Cross Validation vs Leave One O ut
For cross validation [103], the training set is randomly divided into two sets. This includes 
a set of data samples for training, and a validation set. The validation set used as part 
of training is not the same as the test set. The test set is used to evaluate how well 
the SVM classifier performs. It is not correct to use the test set as part of training or 
validation. The classifier trained on a training set and validated on a validation set, is 
expected to be able to predict the dataset that is unseen, i.e., to predict the accuracy on 
the test set. Therefore, the test set cannot be used for training or validation [103].
In the v-fold Cross Validation, the training set D is randomly split into v exclusive folds 
Dv-,v G [l,u]. The classifier is trained and validated v times. At each time, it is trained 
on v-1 folds and validated on 1 fold. The parameters used for SVM training on v-1 fold, 
achieves the highest prediction accuracy on validation 1 fold, is used for training the 
whole training set D to generate a model. The model is used to analyse how good the 
classifier by predicting the accuracy on the test set. Unlike the leave one out, which is 
the complete v fold cross validation, splits datasets into a single fold, i.e., the classifier 
is trained on m — 1  /m  instances and tested on a single one instance, assuming overall 
m  instances available in the dataset. The leave one out is computationally expensive 
compared with cross validation, which is feasible and reliable for small sample datasets.
In our experiments, fifty images are chosen from the UCID image database for each 
printer. In total there are 350 printed-and-scanned images in our image dataset. Fifty 
pages of pure text document from the copyright-free ebook Cutenberg project [102] are 
selected for each printer, giving a total of 350 printed-and-scanned text documents in our
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text dataset.
In order to estimate a classification accuracy with reliability, for five fold cross validation, 
we randomly permute 350 instances dataset 10 times and split them into 210 instances 
for training and validation, and 140 instances for testing. The 210 instances are further 
randomly permuted 10 times into 5 folds, where 168 instances are used for training, 
and 42 instances are used for validation. LIBSVM [105] provides a MATLAB interface 
for SVM-train function and SVM-predict function. The RBF kernel is selected with 
hyperparameter (C,"y) that needs to be tuned to find the best classification performance 
over the 210 instances to generate the classifier. The selection ranges of c and 7  are 
(-5:2:15) and (-15:2:3) respectively. The classifier is further used to predict the 140 
instances. Therefore, the accuracy of the classifier is derived from the average of 100 
predictions, i.e., the number of correctly predicted randomly selected instances out of 
overall instances in the dataset.
For leave one out, 349 instances are used for training, with one instance for testing. After 
350 times of training and testing, the labels of 350 instances are predicted to calculate 
the number of correctly predicted instance labels out of the overall number of instances 
in the dataset of 350. By 5 fold cross validation and leave one out, the performance of 
our proposed LBP descriptor (P, R) =  (8 ,1) is evaluated with confidence under different 
attacks. A comparison study to statistical features based forensic analysis, also revealed 
that the proposed LBP scheme is able to identify^ printers at a high accuracy of printed- 
and-scanned image or text documents with a low variance. In Section 5.5.1, the statistical 
features based forensic analysis is evaluated. A subset of relevant features is selected for 
printing and scanning scenario based on the best classification accuracy of the combined 
feature set.
Feature Selection and Statistical Significance Analysis
In [2], Gou et al. proposed a statistical feature based forensic analysis on scanners 
and scanned images by three different types of features. These features were denoising 
filtering, wavelet analysis and neighbourhood pixel prediction error, giving a total of 60 
dimensional features. The dimensionality of the features was reduced to ten by Linear
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Discriminant Analysis (LDA) [82]. However, our goal is to acquire a better understanding 
about the effectiveness of the individual features and how they relate with each other. 
The results presented in [2] are for the combination of all three features only. Given three 
different types of features: A, B , and C, we identify the accuracy (acc) of:
1 . the features independently, i.e., acc{A), acc{B) and acc(C).
2 . the features in pair-wise combinations, i.e., acc{A + B),acc{A + C) and acc{B pC ).
3. the combination of all three features, i.e., acc{A + B  -\-C).
We tabulate the results of these accuracies and choose the highest value to be the best 
optimum choice of features. In Table 5.7, for each of the independent features, wavelet 
analysis feature is the most significant feature that achieves the highest accuracy of 
86.60% by cross validation, and 90.00% by leave one out. The denoising filtering feature 
is served as a complementary feature to wavelet analysis feature, increasing approximately 
4% accuracy by adding another 10 dimensional features. Therefore, for features in pair­
wise combinations, performance accuracy of the combination of wavelet analysis feature 
and denoising filtering feature, achieves at 91.09% by cross validation and 94.86% by 
leave one out. This is even higher than the performance accuracy of the combination of 
all three features, which is 89.45% by cross validation and 93.14% by leave one out. It 
means that adding another 4 dimensional features of neighbourhood prediction into the 
pair-wise combination of wavelet analysis feature and denoising feature, actually degrades 
the performance of the classifier.
We will also show in Section 5.5.5 that this 4 dimensional neighbourhood prediction 
feature has a computational complexity of 0{N ^). Therefore, the features selected for 
printer identification is the pair-wise combination of wavelet analysis feature and denois­
ing filtering feature which is 16 dimensions in total. These features will be compared 
with our proposed MBL based scheme, and also our proposed LBP descriptor. The per­
formance accuracy of MBL based scheme, is 66.13% by cross validation and 74% by leave 
one out. Among all the features and their combinations, the best performance accuracy 
is achieved by our proposed LBP descriptor, which is 97.92% by cross validation and 
99.43% by leave one out.
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Table 5.7: Features Selection and comparison of selected features to MBL and LBP
Features Dimensions CV(%) Std L0 0 (%)
Independent [2]
Denoise Filtering 1 0 72.21 3.48 80.00
Wavelet Analysis 6 86.60 2.51 90.00
Neighbourhood Pre­
diction
4 63.86 2.74 69.43
Pair-wise [2]
Denoise Filtering +  
Wavelet Analysis
16 91.09 1.85 94.86
Denoise Filtering +
Neighbourhood
Prediction
14 75.49 3.09 83.14
Wavelet Analysis -h
Neighbourhood
Prediction
1 0 88.48 2.84 93.71
All Features [2 ]
Denoise Filtering -f 
Wavelet Analysis -f- 
Neighbourhood 
Prediction
2 0 89.45 2.72 93.14
Our Features
LBP Descriptor 59 97.92 1.08 99.43
MBL 45 66.13 3.32 74
N otes: CV =  Cross Validation, Std =  Standard Deviation, LOO = Leave One Out 
5 .5 .2  P r in te d -a n d -S c a n n e d  Im a g e  id e n tif ic a t io n  a p a r t  f ro m  a t ta c k s
SV M  P erfo rm an ce  o f M ulti-sized  B lock B en fo rd ’s Law (M B L) for P r in te r  
Iden tifica tion
The performance of the proposed MBL scheme is evaluated by the SVM classifier of 
five-fold cross validation and leave one out, over 350 printed-and-scanned images and 
350 printed-and-scanned pure text documents. Image datasets were downloaded from 
UCID [93]. The text datasets were downloaded from the copyright-free ebook Cutenberg 
project [102]. The first fifty pages of the ebook titled -C Em m a  »  consisting of purely 
text document were used. They were printed at 300 dpi by seven printers including 
two identical models from HP LaserJet 4100 as shown in Table 5.6. The printouts were 
scanned into A4 size at 600 dpi greyscale JPEC format by Infotec ISC 3535. A bounding
1 0 0 Chapter 5. Intrinsic Features for Printer Forensics
box was applied to remove the white margin of the scanned images and documents.
As introduced in Section 5.3, the probability of first digit statistics of DCT coefficients 
with block sizes of {8 * 8,16 * 16,32 * 32,64 * 64,128 * 128} in total 1x45 dimensional 
feature vector is extracted for every single image out of 350 printed-and-scanned images. 
In total, 350 instances with 45-dimensional feature space are used for SVM classification. 
As demonstrated in Section 5.5.1, 210 randomly selected instances are used for 5 fold cross 
validation, followed by prediction over the rest 140 instances. The average classification 
accuracy is 66.13% with the standard deviation of 3.32. The confusion matrix is presented 
in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8: Confusion Matrix of Cross Validation based on MBL
Predict
Brand
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HP Laserjet 4200N 98.55% 1.05% 2.70% 1.35% 5.55%
HP Laserjet 4100(1) 33.60% 10.9% 29.95% 6.35% 0 .10%
HP Laserjet 4250 14.60% 45.95% 17.10% 1.45% 17.80%
Train HP Laserjet 4100(2) 33.05% 18.85% 33.75% 1.50% 5.40%
HP Laserjet 4015 0 .20% 0.90% 5.00% 3.70% 93.60% 1.95% 3.05%
HP Laserjet 4500 1.25% 16.80% 16.55% 14.15% 3.45% 62.25% 1.65%
Xerox Phaser 8500 0.05% 0.70% 95.20%
Furthermore, we experimented leave one out to test the 350x45 dimensional feature space 
based on MBL with accuracy at 74%. The confusion matrix is presented in Table 5.9. 
The results for cross validation or leave one out showed that the MBL based scheme 
performed with a relatively poor classification among the printer sets, with specific con­
fusions between HP4100s, HP4250 and HP4500.
SVM  Perform ance o f LBP Descriptor
For (P, R) =  (8,1) LBP descriptor, 59 dimensional features were extracted for each 
printed-and-scanned image. In total 350 instances with 59-dimensional feature space
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Table 5.9: Confusion Matrix of Leave One Out based on MBL
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HP Laserjet 4200N 100% 2%
HP Laserjet 4100(1) 34% 6% 26% 6%
HP Laserjet 4250 18% 56% 10% 2% 12%
HP Laserjet 4100(2) 30% 18% 56% 6%
HP Laserjet 4015 2% 2% 96%
HP Laserjet 4500 16% 16% 6% 2% 76%
Xerox Phaser 8500 2% 100%
were used for SVM classification. As indicated in Section 5.5.1, 350 instances were 
randomly divided into 210 instances for 5 fold cross validation and 140 instances for 
testing. During 5 fold cross validation, 210 instances randomly were split into 5 fold for 
training and validation. In total 100 random permutations were performed to estimate 
the classification accuracy, which is the average of the number of correctly predicted 
labels out of 140 instances. The classification accuracy was approximately 97.92%, with 
the standard deviation of 1.08. The confusion matrix is presented in Table 5.10.
Table 5.10: Confusion Matrix of Cross Validation based on LBP Descriptor
Predict
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HP Laserjet 4200N 100%
HP Laserjet 4100(1) 91.80% 5.85%
Train HP Laserjet 4250 100% 0.50%
HP Laserjet 4100(2) 7.80% 93.65%
HP Laserjet 4015 100%
HP Laserjet 4500 0.40% 100%
Xerox Phaser 8500 100%
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In addition, we also applied leave one out to test the 350 instances with 59 dimensional 
feature space with the proposed LBP descriptor at (P,R)  =  (8,1). An accuracy rate of 
99.43% was achieved. Table 5.11 presents the results of the confusion matrix of 7 printers 
with the most confusion comes hom the two HP 4100 printers at a 2% mis-classification 
rate, which is the same as the confusion demonstrated by 5 fold cross validation presented 
in Table 5.10.
Table 5.11: Confusion Matrix of Leave One Out based on LBP Descriptor
Predict
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HP Laserjet 4200N 100%
HP Laserjet 4100(1) 98% 2%
HP Laserjet 4250 100%
HP Laserjet 4100(2) 2% 98%
HP Laserjet 4015 100%
HP Laserjet 4500 100%
Xerox Phaser 8500 100%
SVM  Perform ance o f Statistical Features [2] for Printer Identification
In this section, we evaluate the performance of utilizing the features investigated in 
Section 5.5.1 for identifying the printers as given in Table 5.6. As demonstrated in 
Table 5.7, the wavelet analysis and denoising filtering have been selected for identifying 
printed-and-scanned image by seven different printers. Therefore, for each image, a 
16-dimensional feature vector is extracted. In total, a 350x16-dimension feature space is 
constructed for SVM classification. The five fold cross validation is the same as presented 
in Section 5.5.1. An accuracy rate at 91.09% is achieved by 100 time random permutation 
of dataset, with a standard deviation of 1.85. As presented by confusion matrix in 
Table 5.12, the HP 4100(1) achieves a 23.30% confusion with HP4200(2). HP4200(2) 
only achieves a 68.65% accuracy rate to identify itself. As compared with the proposed
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LBP descriptor, the confusion is more widely dispersed between HP models. For leave 
one out, the identification rate is 94.86%, and the confusion matrix is given in Table 5.13.
Table 5.12: Confusion Matrix of Cross Validation based on Selected Features in [2]
Predict
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HP Laserjet 4200N 99.90% 0.85% 0.05%
HP Laserjet 4100(1) 72.60% 0.05% 26.60% 0.05%
Train HP Laserjet 4250 0.05% 98.05% 0.50% 0.05% 0.45%
HP Laserjet 4100(2) 23.30% 0.35% 68.65% 0.40%
HP Laserjet 4015 1.50% 0.60% 2.05% 99.85% 0.55%
HP Laserjet 4500 0.10% 2.55% 0.10% 2.20% 0.05% 98.55%
Xerox Phaser 8500 100%
Table 5.13: Confusion Matrix of Leave One Out based on Selected Features in [2]
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HP Laserjet 4200N 100%
HP Laserjet 4100(1) 82% 18%
HP Laserjet 4250 100%
HP Laserjet 4100(2) 16% 82%
HP Laserjet 4015 100%
HP Laserjet 4500 2% 100%
Xerox Phaser 8500 100%
As presented in Table 5.7, the denoising filtering was proposed as the first group of 
features as discussed in [2]. We evaluate the SVM performance via cross validation and 
leave one out in Table 5.14 and Table 5.15, respectively. For the denoising filtering, 
10 dimensional features are extracted from 350 printed-and-scanned images to construct
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a 350x10 dimensional feature space into SVM classifier. As discussed in Section 5.5.1, 
via five-fold cross validation, the average accuracy of 100 times of prediction is 72.21%, 
with a standard devidation of 3.48. The corresponding confusion matrix is presented in 
Table 5.14. For leave one out, the classification accuracy is 80%. The confusion matrix 
is given in Table 5.15. The most confusions come from the printers HP4100s, HP4250 
and HP4500 similar to results achieved by MBL presented in Table 5.9.
Table 5.14: Confusion Matrix of Cross Validation based on Denoise Filtering
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HP Laserjet 4200N 98.30% 0.35% 2.90%
HP Laserjet 4100(1) 51.65% 15.75 26.15% 4.70%
Train HP Laserjet 4250 11.55% 38.55% 8.95% 1.00% 21.95%
HP Laserjet 4100(2) 0.20% 23.05% 25.90% 57.75% 9.25%
HP Laserjet 4015 0 .10% 7.20% 2.05% 0.55% 99.00% 1.00%
HP Laserjet 4500 1.40% 6.55% 17.4% 6.60% 60.20%
Xerox Phaser 8500 100%
Table 5.15: Confusion Matrix of Leave One Out based on Denoise Filtering
Predict
§
rH a o
o 8 lO 8 1—1 o lO
8 8 8 oo <D
■p?
0)
'(7
o
’ l? ■p? 1I I Od I I 1 CL
L L I L I L L ë
CL CL CL CL CL CL cu
Brand K W M X
HP Laserjet 4200N 100% 2.00%
HP Laserjet 4100(1) 68.00%14.00% 24.00% 2.00%
Train HP Laserjet 4250 8.00% 48.00% 6.00% 12.00%
HP Laserjet 4100(2) 22.00%22.00% 66.00% 6.00%
HP Laserjet 4015 2.00% 2.00% 0 100%
HP Laserjet 4500 14.00% 4.00% 78%
Xerox Phaser 8500 100%
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5 .5 .3  P r in ted -a n d -sca n n ed  T ex t D o cu m e n ts  C lassification
As discussed in Section 5.5.2, our proposed LBP descriptor based scheme achieved a 
good classification accuracy for printer identification. In this section, we investigate the 
performance of LBP descriptor based scheme on the printed-and-scanned text document. 
Under the validation for pure text document dataset, the performance of our proposed 
LBP descriptor achieves an identification rate of 98.06%, with a standard deviation of 
1.24. As presented in Table 5.16, the confusion between printers HP 4100(1) and HP 
4100(2) is relatively small at approximately 2%.
Table 5.16: Confusion Matrix of Cross Validation based on Text Documents of LBP 
Descriptor
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HP Laserjet 4200N 97.15% 0.25% 1.05% 0.95%
HP Laserjet 4100(1) 0.85% 97.65% 0.05% 2.80% 0 .20%
Train HP Laserjet 4250 0.25% 0.30% 98.70% 0 .20%
HP Laserjet 4100(2) 0.55% 1.80% 0.05% 95.40% 0.20%
HP Laserjet 4015 0 .10% 0 .10% 98.35% 0.80%
HP Laserjet 4500 1.10% 0.05% 0.65% 0.25% 99.20%
Xerox Phaser 8500 1.00% 100%
A 98% accuracy rate is achieved by leave one out with the confusion matrix presented 
in Table 5.17.
5 .5 .4  T h e  R o b u stn ess  A g a in st A rb itrary  Im age P r o cess in g  O p era tion s
The proposed LBP scheme was tested for robustness against a series of image processing 
operations, including averaging filtering, median filtering, sharpening, rotation, JPEG 
compression and resizing.
Average Filtering Operations
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Table 5.17: Confusion Matrix of Leave One Out based on Text Documents of LBP 
Descriptor
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HP Laserjet 4200N 96% 2%
HP Laserjet 4100(1) 98% 2%
HP Laserjet 4250 2% 98%
HP Laserjet 4100(2) 2% 98%
HP Laserjet 4015 98% 2%
HP Laserjet 4500 2% 98%
Xerox Phaser 8500 2% 100%
Average filtering filters the image with the predefined averaging filter of size 3x3, 
5x5 and 7x7. In the experiment, we perform averaging filtering on 350 printed- 
and-scanned images, resulting in three different filtered datasets. The accuracies 
achieved by leave one out of the filtered datasets are presented in Table 5.18. The 
performance of our proposed LBP descriptor is consistent for smaller filter sizes 
with only a slight decrease of 4% classification rate for a filter size of 7x7. This 
is because average filtering is a linear operation. Therefore, LBP takes the signed 
differences to the neighbourhood pixel values, which remains invariant towards any 
linear operation.
• Median Filtering Operations
In the experiment, median filtering of orders 3 , 5 and 7 [106] were applied to 350 
printed-and-scanned images. The performance of leave one out reveals that our 
proposed LBP descriptor maintains a good robustness against median filtering as 
presented in Table 5.18.
• Sharpening Operation
The sharpening operation filters an image with a 3-by-3 unsharpened contrast en­
hancement filter, with shaping factors of 0, 0.2, 0.4 and 0.6. In the experiment.
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350 printed-and-scanned images were sharpened by shaping factors of 0, 0.2, 0.4 
and 0.6 to form four sharpened image datasets for classification by leave one out. 
The accuracies of the classifier decrease as the images sharpened from 0 to 0.4. It 
improves by 0.3% accuracy with shaping factor of 0.6 as shown in Table 5.18.
• JPEG Compression Operation
For JPEG compression, 350 printed-and-scanned images in TIFF format were com­
pressed with quality factors of 70, 80, 90, and 100 [107]. The leave one out accuracy 
was tested over each of these four compressed image datasets. As presented in Ta­
ble 5.18, our proposed LBP descriptor achieves good robustness against JPEG 
compression. This is because the random binary texture pattern generated is con­
stant to any monotonie grey scale transformation. It is worth mentioning that the 
classifier accuracy is also maintained even at the JPEG compression quality factor 
of 75, at which most of other forensic schemes begin to degrade [2].
• Rotation Operation
Rotation operation rotates an image by an angle in degrees in an anti-clockwise 
direction around its center point, using the bilinear interpolation method. In the 
experiment, we tested our proposed LBP descriptor for rotation angles of 1 degree, 
5 degrees, 10 degrees and 20 degrees. As presented in Table 5.18, the accuracies 
of our proposed LBP descriptor remained constant at an average of 99.1425% with 
±0.2327 variation.
• Resizing Operation
Resizing operation scales an image at a scaling factor of 0.5, 0.75, 1.25 and 1.5 by 
bicubic interpolation method. In the experiment, 350 printed-and-scanned images 
were resized by these four different scaling factors. Leave one out was applied to 
predict the classification accuracy of seven printers. As given in Table 5.18, the 
classification accuracy remained the lowest at the scaling factor of 0.5 and achieved 
the maximum at scaling factor of 1.5.
In summary, these operations have a minimum impact on the classification perfor­
mance of our proposed scheme, which further confirms that the LBP descriptor is 
a unique and stable forensic feature for printing-and-scanning.
108 Chapter 5. Intrinsic Features for Printer Forensics
Table 5.18: Robustness of LBP Descriptor by Leave One Out Classification Accuracies
Attacks Parameter Accuracy(%) Attacks Parameter Accuracy(%)
3 98.00 3 99.43
Average Filtering 5 98.86 Median Filtering 5 98.86
7 94.86 7 98.57
0 99.71 1 98.86
0.2 99.43 5 99.14
Sharpening 0.4 98.57 Rotation 10 99.43
0.6 98.86 20 99.14
100 99.71 0.5 96.57
90 99.14 0.75 98.86
JPEG compression 80 98.86 Resizing 1.25 97.43
70 99.14 1.5 99.43
5 .5 .5  C o m p u ta tio n  C o m p lex ity  A n a lysis
Low-complexity of feature extraction is always an important consideration for practical 
implementation. We have analysed the computation complexity for all features mentioned 
in this chapter as presented in Table 5.19. W ithout loss of generality, we assume the im­
ages are square size. For denoise filtering [2], which uses a filtering operation, typically 
has a complexity of 0 { N  log N ). If the mean and standard deviation are applied, then 
each of them costs a complexity of 0{ N)  resulting in a maximum complexity of 0{N) .  
Similarly, for wavelet feature extraction [2], the complexity is similar to the Discrete 
Fourier Tïansform (DFT) process. The fast operation of DFT will cost a complexity 
of 0 { N  log N).  Neighbourhood Prediction [2] needs to solve nonnegative least-square 
problem (NNLS) for each pixel of the image. The NNLS complexity is 0 { N  x  B^),  where 
B is the 3x3 block size coefficients estimation. Then mean and standard deviation are 
applied to the estimated image with a complexity of 0{N) .  Therefore, Neighbourhood 
Prediction has a complexity of 0{N^) .  The computational complexity of the features pro­
posed in [2], in total is counted as 0{N^) .  The features selected for printer identification 
based on a combination of denoising filtering and wavelet analysis, have a computational 
complexity of 0{N^) .  Compared with these features, LBP descriptor only calculates 
(P, R) neighbouring patterns for each pixel of the image. A histogram costs a constant 
computation. As such, the complexity of LBP is a polynomial 0{N) .
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Table 5.19: Computational Complexity Analysis Comparison to [2]
Schemes Features Complexity
Scheme in [2]
Denoising Filtering 0 (N )
Wavelet Analysis 0 { N  log N)
Neighbourhood Prediction O(AT )^
Denoising Filtering-^ 
Wavelet Analysis-1- 
Neighbourhood Prediction
Denoising Filtering+ Wavelet 
Analysis
Our Scheme LBP descriptor 0 (N )
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed two schemes for printer identification, i.e., a statistical 
analysis based on MBL and a texture analysis based on LBP. The proposed MBL based 
scheme provided a good classification performance at identifying printers of different 
brands. However, it was shown less accurate at identifying printers of similar models. 
The proposed LBP based scheme achieved the classification accuracy up to 97.92% by 
cross validation and 99.40% by leave one out, which was at least 6% improvement in 
accuracy to Gou et aZ.’s approach [2]. The proposed LBP based scheme was also found 
to be superior invariant under a series of image operations, including filtering, sharpening, 
rotation, resizing and JPEF compression. Moreover, the proposed LBP based scheme 
had a lower computational complexity at 0{N) .
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we focused on the image authentication in the print-and-scanning chan­
nel consisting of different stages including error diffusion halftoning during printing and 
scanning hardcopies of images after printing. Our proposed techniques addressed au­
thentication issues in different stages. They were presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, 
respectively.
In Chapter 3, we focused on error diffusion process in printing which generated images 
in binary format. Watermarking was used for image authentication. Embedding water­
marks in error diffusion process degraded image quality. We formalized this process by 
a linear gain model. Based on this model, we designed an iterative watermarking error 
diffusion algorithm that could minimize the sharpening and uneven tonality distortions. 
Compared to Fu and Au’s algorithm [1], our proposed model reduced a significant amount 
of distortions achieving perceptual quality improvement of 6.5% to 12% by WSNR and 
11% to 23% by VIF.
However, both our algorithm and Fu and Au’s algorithm provided a limited robust­
ness against geometrical distortions during printing-and-scanning. This motivated us to 
our research work in Chapter 4 on the development of robust image hashing based au­
thentication techniques for printing-and-scanning. After scanning, the image format is
1 1 1
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converted into greyscale. To address the integrity of authentication, we proposed an im­
age hashing algorithm based on SIFT feature and introduced a normalization procedure 
to synchronize printed-and-scanned images before SIFT feature extraction. In order to 
achieve the performance trade-off between robustness and fragility of image hashing, we 
computed the proposed SIFT local descriptor based on a randomly selected scale space 
and orientation at each pixel located at the centre of randomly selected image blocks.
The Normalized Hamming Distance (NHD) and Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) 
were used to measure the robustness and discrimination of image hashing. For our pro­
posed hashing algorithm, the average NHD between original digital images and their 
printed-and-scanned versions was approximately 0.0873. The average NHD between orig­
inal digital images and different printed-and-scanned images was approximately 0.3648. 
We compared our proposed method with two other popular image hashing algorithms, 
singular value decomposition based image hashing (SVD-hash) [20] and feature-point 
based image hashing (FP-hash) [10]. For SVD-hash, it achieved approximately a NHD 
of 0.1750 between original digital images and their printed-and-scanned versions, and a 
NHD of 0.2751 between original digital images and different printed-and-scanned images. 
For FP-hash, it achieved approximately a NHD of 0.3858 between original digital images 
and their printed-and-scanned versions, and a NHD of 0.4643 between original digital 
images and different printed-and-scanned images. The results showed that the NHDs of 
SVD-hash and FP-hash were unable to discriminate different printed-and-scanned images 
and not robust to print-and-scan processes. However, the ROC analysis clearly demon­
strated the statistical advantages of our hash algorithm as compared to the SVD-hash 
and FP-hash algorithms.
In Chapter 5, to authenticate the source of printed-and-scanned images, we proposed two 
printer identification algorithms, i.e., a statistical analysis based on Multi-sized block 
Benford’s Law (MBL), and a texture analysis based on Local Binary Pattern (LBP) 
descriptor. The proposed MBL based algorithm was able to identify different brands 
of printers but was less accurate with similar models of printers. The proposed LBP 
based approach achieved a high identification rate at approximately 99.4%, with a low 
variance. In particular, our LBP based approach achieved a low 2% mis-identihcation 
rate between two identical printers, whereas Gou et aVs approach [2] achieved a high
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20% mis-identification rate. Our proposed LBP based approach was also found to be 
robust against common image processing attacks, including averaging filtering, median 
filtering, sharpening, rotation, resizing, and JPEG compression. More importantly, the 
LBP based approach was found to be computationally efficient, with a computational 
complexity of 0{N) .
The authenticate techniques we proposed dealt with different image formats, i.e., binary 
and grayscale. Therefore, the thesis was named as multi-level image authentication 
techniques in printing-and-scanning. Our contribution in watermarking was to build a 
novel mathematical model during printing. On the other hand, image hashing can provide 
integrity mechanism aiming to detect forgery of images while printer identification can 
authenticate images generated from the authorized printers. The proposed authentication 
techniques combined can provide a complete system for authentication in printing-and- 
scanning.
6.2 Future Work
There are a number of research areas which can be further improved for our future work 
in digital watermarking, image hashing and digital forensics for multi-level and halftone 
images discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, respectively.
In Chapter 3, we addressed the imperceptibility of watermark embedding issue and pro­
posed a linear gain model to preserve image perceptual quality based on an error diffusion 
halftoning process. A number of dithering halftone algorithms have been commonly de­
ployed by laser printers. It should be feasible to extend our proposed model to embedding 
watermarks in dithering halftone algorithms.
In Chapter 4, the SIFT features of our proposed image hashing were reduced from 128 
dimensions to 1 dimension using a logistic function, but other feature dimension reduction 
techniques should also be investigated to generate a one-dimensional binary feature vector 
for Hamming distance comparison. Another area of future work is the development of 
localisation methods to identify the changes of maliciously attacked image content.
In Chapter 5, our proposed LBP based printer identification approach was experimented
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on 7 printers, including two identical devices of the same model. The proposed LBP 
based approach outperformed Gou et a/.’s [2] approach particularly for individual printer 
identification. However, in order to improve the overall classification accuracy for identi­
cal printers from different models and brands, a larger dataset of printers will be needed 
to further evaluate our proposed LBP based approach.
Finally, the work flow in our printer identification in Figure 5.1 assumes that the forensic 
analyst prints the document and then scans it back with the same scanner. For future 
work, it would be of significant benefits to adapt our printer identification approach 
for scanner identification, which is currently considered to be a relatively new field of 
research.
Appendix A
D erivation of Equation Lyj in  
Chapter 3
This appendix is derivation of the equation L^.  In [50], the standard error diffusion 
transfer equation with signal transform function and noise transform function, can be 
expressed as z-transformation
l  +  \  +  (Kn -  m ( z )
 ^ ^  ..
S T F
Replace equation (3.11) into equations (3.1) and (3.10). We obtain:
e { i j )  =  1 - y o { i J )  (A.2)
= x { i j )  - h { i , j ) * e { i , j )  (A.3)
x ' \ i , j )  = x ' { i J )  + Lyjx{i,j)  (A.4)
yoihj )  = Q{x"{i , j))  (A.5)
y i h j )  = l - 2 /o ( b j )  (A.6)
Substituting x'{i , j)  in equation (A.3) into equation (A.4), and taking z transform, we
have
X ''(z) =  (l +  L«,)A :(z)-L f(z)E(z) (A.7)
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W(i.j)
QQialftone)
R(data hiding)
H(z)
G(Z)
Figure A.l: Equivalent modified circuit
From equation (A.2) and (equation A.3), taking the z transform, we have 
R om  equation (A.7) and equation (A.8), we derive
(A.8)
X "(z) =  (A.9)
In Figure A .l, we draw the equivalent modified circuit to watermarking linear gain 
model, we obtain
e{i,j) =  1 -  yo{i,j) -  
x " i h j )  =  g { i j )  * x { i j )  -  h { i j )  * e{i,j)  
yoihj )  = Q{x' '{iJ))
y{i , j )  = 1 - yoihj )
(A.IO)
(A .ll)
(A.12)
(A.13)
where g(i , j )  is impulse response of G(z). From equation (A.IO) and equation (A .ll), we 
have
E(z) =
^  — Yo{z) — G{z)X  (z) 
l - H { z )
(A.14)
we substitute equation (A.14) into the z-transform of equation (A .ll) ,we derive
equation (A.9) is equal to equation (A.15),when
jf(z)
l - / f ( z )
=  G(z) +
G ( z) H ( z )
l - H ( z ) (A.16)
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Then, we obtain
G(z) = l  + [ l - H { z ) ] L ^  (A.17)
If we compare equation (A.17) with the Signal Transform Function expressed in equation 
(A.l),in which the watermarked halftone image with linear gain Kyj has the same signal
transfer function, G(z) can be expressed as the reciprocal of the STF. Thus,
Lu, =  (A.18)
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